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THE LAW OF WORDS: STANDING, ENVIRONMENT,
AND OTHER CONTESTED TERMS
David N. Cassuto*
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000). exposes fundamental incoherencies within environmental standing doctrine, even while it ostensibly makes standing easier to
prove for plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits. According to Laidlaw, an
environmental plaintiff needs only to show personal injury to satisfy Article
111's standing requirement; she need not show that the alleged statutory
violation actually harms the environment. This Article argues that Laidlaw's
distinction between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment is
nonsensical. Both the majority and dissent in Laidlaw incorrectly assume
that there exists an objective standard by which a plainti8 society or a court
can measure harm or injury. Using examples drawn both from history (the
Trail Smelter Arbitration ( 1 9 3 M 1 ) ) and fiction (Barbara Kingsolver's novel
Animal Dreams), this Article illustrates that the inherent contingency of
language renders it impossible to dejine harm or injury without acknowledging
the systemic perspective from which the concepts are viewed.
The path to an intelligible standing doctrine lies not in focusing on this
artijicial opposition, but instead in acknowledging statutory violations as
injurious to the social and legal system of which we all form a part. Assuming the violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the resulting harm
to the system could and should enable individuals to sue. This policy would
conform the Court's standing jurisprudence to the language and intent of
the statutes before it. Moreover, this policy would counter the undermining
of the rhetoric of environmental protection that persists so long as the Supreme Court continues its frequent yet unsuccessful efforts to retool its dejinition of cognizable legal injury.

This Article is about one sentence. The sentence, found in the majority
opinion of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc.,' reads as follows:

Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; Ph.D., Indiana
University. I would like to thank William Fletcher, Ben Gershman, Don Doernberg, John
Nolon, Ann Powers, Jeffrey Miller, Jerrob Duffy, Arthur Haubenstock, and Ike and Tobby
Cassuto for their insights, comments, and help with this Article, and Brian Brittingham for
his research assistance. A very special thanks to Elizabeth Downes, my partner in everything, who made this piece possible.
528 U.S. 167 (2000) [hereinafter Laidlaw IV]. Since the Article discusses two district
court opinions, a Fourth Circuit appeal, and a Supreme Court case with the same case
name, the Article will employ a numbering system for all of the Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., decisions: 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995)
[hereinafter Luidlaw 4, 956 F. Supp. 588 (D.S.C. 1997) [hereinafter Laidlaw 111, 149 F.3d
303 (4th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Laidlaw IIg.
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The relevant showing for purposes of Article I11 standing . . . is
not injury to the environment but injury to the la in tiff.^
Both alone and in the context of the full opinion, this sentence exposes
fundamental incoherencies within standing doctrine, especially with respect to standing's relationship with environmental law. This Article argues that the opposition the sentence creates-injury to the plaintiff versus harm to the environment-is both nonsensical and entirely ancillary
to the language and purpose of the statute Laidlaw supposedly interprets.
Declaiming that injury to the plaintiff rather than harm to the environment comprises the requisite for standing enables the Court to ground its
basis for standing in an opposition that makes no sense, even though it is
firmly grounded in p r e ~ e d e n t In
. ~ other words, the sentence (and, consequently, the rest of the opinion) is simultaneously legally strong and
rhetorically incoherent.
The path to an intelligible standing doctrine does not lie in such
fruitless comparisons. It lies instead in acknowledging statutory violations as injurious to the social and legal system of which we all form a
part.4 Assuming the violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the
resulting harm to the system could and should enable individuals to sue.
This policy would relieve the Supreme Court of having to constantly retool its definition of cognizable legal injury. It would also conform the
Court's standing jurisprudence to the language and intent of the statutes
before it. Under the current regime, the statutory language often factors
very little in the Court's analysis.
Even though its holding enhances citizen suit standing, Luidlaw nevertheless continues a trend wherein the environment is consistently marginalized within environmental jurispr~dence.~
Using examples drawn both
from history (the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1930-41)) and fiction (Barbara Kingsolver's novel Animal Dreams), this Article attempts to situate
Laidlaw within the context of the larger issue of a growing incoherence
that is undermining the rhetoric of environmental protection.
Laidlaw also highlights structural problems within the larger legal
system-problems that date at least from the time of Galileo's trial in the

*Id. at 181.
3See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
See infra Part 1V.A.
Many commentators view Laidlaw as an unalloyed positive because of its relaxed
standing requirements. See, e.g., RICHARD
J . PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTREATISE
1140 (4th ed. 2002); Jeffrey G. Miller & Chris Hilton, The Standing of Citizens to Enforce
Against Violations of Environmental Statutes in the United States, 12 J . ENVTL.L. 370,
379 (2000) (noting that Laidlaw "treats citizen suits as a valued and legitimate form of
litigation . . . [which] sends positive signals to lower courts about the value of citizen suits
. . . ."). My own view is more tempered. I see the decision as a triage rather than a lasting
cure.
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seventeenth century. Galileo was accused of defying the Church's prohibition against defending and teaching Copernicus's theory that the earth
revolved around a stable sun, rather than vice-versa. By maintaining that
canonical law was not objective truth and that the sun did not revolve
around the earth, Galileo forever undermined the law's a ~ t h o r i t y .His
~
subsequent trial precipitated the downfall of the notion of law as objective and immutable, replacing it with the equally problematic notion of
an objective and immutable science. Though the idea of an objective science has also fallen into disfavor in recent years,' it retains great currency, particularly within jurisprudence. Often the law aligns itself with
science, effectively cloaking itself with the mantle of o b j e c t i ~ i t yI. ~call
this phenomenon a "Galileo Problem" and take it up at greater length in
Part V. Galileo Problems arise from attempts to manufacture permanent
and unwavering truths from words that can at best express the historically
or analytically contingent products of human thought and language. In
Laidlaw, a Galileo Problem manifests when the concept of harm is
treated as an objectively ascertainable fact and parleyed into a norm and
then into law.
Norms are language-based, their existence a product of communication among the members of the social system. That the law is formed of
words is hardly news. But when those words are contingent, they form a
shaky foundation upon which to rest a lattice of norms.
Laidlaw offers a compelling demonstration of a type of contingent
language whose use undermines the Court's credibility, sowing the seeds
of an environmental legitimation c r i ~ i sThe
. ~ rhetoric of both the majority
6Galileo also argued that his views (based on the theories of ~ o ~ e r n i c b sdid
) not
conflict with the teachings of the Church. It bears noting that the geocentric theory of the
universe (i.e., that the sun revolved around the earth) was based as much on the teachings
of Ptolemy and Aristotle as on any scriptural authority. Once given the imprimatur of the
Church, however, the theory rose above scrutiny. See generally JEROMEJ. LANGFORD,
GALILEO,SCIENCE
A N D THE CHURCH
(1992).
' S e e , e.g., STEPHENTOULMIN,
THE RETURNTO COSMOLOGY:
POSTMODERN
SCIENCE
A N D THE THEOLOGY
OF NATURE
255 (1982) ("[Tlhe pure scientist's traditional posture as
. . . spectator, can no longer be maintained: we are always-and inescapably-participants
or agents as well."); CAROLYN
MERCHANT,
ECOLOGICAL
REVOLUTIONS:
NATURE,GENDER,
A N D SCIENCEI N NEW ENGLAND
4 (1989) ("Science is an ongoing negotiation with nonhuman nature for what counts as reality."); EVELYNFOX KELLER,SECRETSOF LIFE, SECRETS OF DEATH:ESSAYS
ON LANGUAGE,
GENDERA N D SCIENCE74 (1992):
[Tlhe standard response to so-called relativist arguments has been that . . . scientific stories are different . . . for the simple reason that they "work" . . . As routinely as the effectiveness of science is invoked, equally routine is the failure to
go on to say what it is that science works at, to note that "working" is a necessary
but not sufficient constraint.
See MICHELSERRES,THENATURAL
CONTRACT
86 (1995) (noting that we live now in
a world where science alone is believed and "where only its courts judge in a doubly competent way, uniting law and non-law").
See JURGENHABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION
CRISIS68 (1975). Legitimation crises inevitably occur when people no longer trust in the certitude of a central authority. See id. at
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and dissenting opinions reveals fundamental misapprehensions about the
role of language within the law, and of the language of law as it relates to
standing and the environment. Consequently, the case brings into stark
relief a number of the most vexing aspects of standing doctrine's incompatibility with environmental jurisprudence.
My discussion of the Laidlaw opinion requires several detours that
frame the parts of this Article. Part I1 examines the evolution of standing
doctrine and situates it with respect to environmental law in general and
the Laidlaw decision in particular. Part I11 examines the convoluted result
for standing doctrine of the distinction between injury to individuals and
harm to environment. Part IV offers an overview of systems theory, the
critical apparatus through which I approach the discussion. It uses the
Trail Smelter Arbitration and Animal Dreams to illustrate the implications of the issues raised by the case. The Trail Smelter Arbitration offers
a real-life example of the consequences of contingent language. Animal
Dreams underscores the dangers inherent in such language, demonstrating that the problem does not lie in a given set of circumstances, but
rather with the larger phenomenon of linguistic uncertainty, a characteristic that is equally present in fact and fiction. Part V suggests a possible
means of egress-predicated in systems theory-from the rhetorical morass created by the Court's standing doctrine and by modern environmental jurisprudence. It applies this new framework to Laidlaw, and then
attempts to show how the rhetorical basis for a new, more effective system of environmental laws already exists to some degree in the language
of statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").'O
The purpose of this Article is not simply to empty my quiver into the
hail of arrows already directed at standing doctrine." It rather seeks to
point out how standing is both symptom and cause of a larger incoherence that undermines our national understanding of, and commitment to,
environmental protection. This incoherence can be resolved, I argue, by
abandoning the convoluted and impractical doctrine of standing and
cleaving instead to a standard of injury derived from the statutes themselves, a standard measured by whether the injury alleged negatively af74-75 ("A legitimation crisis . . . must be based on a motivation crisis-that is, a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state . . . and the motivation supplied by
the socio-cultural system on the other.").
lo 42 U.S.C. $3 4321-4370 (2000).
I ' See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47
UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing for Animals]; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 M I C H .
L. REV. 163 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?]; Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTCERSL. REV. 397 (1996); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALEL.J. 221 (1988); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Justiciabilify, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence on Lyons,
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the MinJ. 76 (1973); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees
eral King Decision, 13 NAT.RESOURCES
Have Standing?-Toward h g a l Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL.L. REV.450 (1972).
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fects the well-being, longevity and self-reproductive capacity of the social system.
The social system is the web of communication and shared expectations that enable human interaction.I2 These expectations are codified as
norms and enacted into law.I3 Laws offer concrete articulations of the
normative standards that enable the social system to function smoothly.14
Deviation from those standards can create injury, not necessarily to individuals, but to the system's ability to function and self-reproduce. That
injury to the system-rather than to individuals-should determine the
viability of citizen suits.
This method of measuring harm is essentially identical to that of statutes that do not contain a private right of action, and its logic is simple and
compelling. Both citizen suits and government enforcement actions are
statutory creations, and both seek the same goal--observance of the law.
Adhering to a standard that was broadly applicable to both types of action-instead of relying on a scattershot standing doctrine-would provide
some welcome clarity to the chaotic world of environmental juri~prudence.'~

A. Article III and the Evolution of Standing
Article I11 of the Constitution limits the judicial branch's power of
decision to cases or controversies.16 From these constitutional limits, the
Court fashioned standing doctrine, a doctrine designed to ensure that the
litigating parties are truly adverse and have personal stakes in the outcome," as well as to preserve the separation of p ~ w e r s . Over
'~
time, this
commitment to codifying and safeguarding the constitutional role of the
judicial branch has evolved into a set of rules described by the Court in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc. :
l2 See NIKLAS
LUHMANN,
ECOLOGICAL
COMMUNICATION
7 (1989) ('"[S]ociety' signifies
the all-encompassing social system of mutually referring communications. It originates
through communicative acts alone and differentiates itself from an environment of other
kinds of systems through the continual reproduction of communication by communication.").
l 3 See NIKLASLUHMANN,
A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY
OF LAWix (Martin Albrow ed.,
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985).
l4 See Paul H . Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utiliry of Deserr, 91 Nw. U.L. REV.
453, 473 (1997) ("The law is . . . a vehicle by which the community debates, tests, and
ultimately settles upon and expresses its norms.").
l5 This approach to standing is equally applicable to non-environmental cases. Under
this framework, the unworkable "injury-in-fact" test would be replaced by a statute-based
determination of injury. Much of the Court's current need for unwieldy injury analysis
would be eliminated without running afoul of the requirements of Article 111.
l6 See U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 2.
l7 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
See id. at 96-97; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[Tlhe law of Article
I11 standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.").
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Art. I11 requires the party who invokes the court's authority to
"show that he personally has suffered some actual legal or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant," and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable deci~ion."'~
Courts commonly summarize the Valley Forge criteria as injury-in-fact,
causation, and r e d r e s ~ a b i l i t y .Together,
~~
these requirements form what
the Supreme Court calls the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."2' In addition, as in Laidlaw, an association or organization may sue
on behalf of its members when its members would have standing in their
own right, the interests at stake are germane to the purposes of the group,
and neither the claim nor the relief requested requires the participation of
the individual members.22
While these requirements appear straightforward, they are surprisingly opaque, and their relationship to the case or controversy requirement
of Article I11 has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the approximately
eighty years since the Court began crafting its criteria for standing,23 it
has contorted both language and precedent in an ongoing and futile attempt to divorce the concept of standing from the substantive issues of
law within the cause of action.
The structural problems within standing law are well documented.
One commentator, noting that the doctrine has been called everything from
"incoherent" to "permeated with sophistry," concludes that its intellectual
structure is "ill-matched to the task it is asked to perform."24 Another
calls the doctrine "one of the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire
domain of public law,"25 while still another labels standing's injury-infact requirement "a large scale conceptual mistake."26

19454U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted).
20See,e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998).
21 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
22 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
23 See Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ("The party who invokes the power
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."); see
also Fletcher, supra note 1 1, at 225-26 (noting that modern standing doctrine (i.e., injuryin-fact, causation, and redressability) began to take shape in the 1930s).
24 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 221; cf: David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing,
1981 SUP.CT. REV.41,42 (1982).
2 5 F l a ~v.t Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
465, 498 n.6 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)).
26 See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 1, at 167.
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Uneasy Marriage

Citizen suits create some of standing's thorniest dilemmas. They occur when a statute provides a private right of action for its enfor~ement.~'
According to Judge Skelly Wright, the citizen suit provides a method of
ensuring that "important legislative purposes heralded in the halls of
Congress are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucra~y."~~
Because citizen suits are filed in the public interest, their
successful prosecution normally results in fines paid to the government
rather than to the plaintiff^.^^ Citizen plaintiffs benefit from the imposition of any injunctive relief as well as from the deterrent power of the
suit against future violation^.^^ While such suits have proved to be potent
weapons in the enforcement arsenal, they are not always possible. A provision enabling them must be written into the relevant law. Federal environmental statutes often contain such provisions and the Clean Water Act
is no e ~ c e p t i o n . ~ '
The critical sentence from L a i d l ~ wpurportedly
~~
describes the type
of injury required for standing to file a citizen suit under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter "Clean Water Act," "CWA," or
Yet, the citizen suit provision of the Act makes no mention of
injury. It states simply that a citizen whose interests are or may be adversely affected may file suit if a prospective defendant is "in violation of
an . . . effluent standard or l i m i t a t i ~ n . " ~ ~
27 The relevant provision of the Clean Water Act, for example, authorizes federal district courts to entertain suits brought by "a person or persons having an interest which is or
may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. $ 1365(a),(g) (2000).
28Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1 I 1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1971). (Then) Judge Scalia took issue with Skelly Wright's comment, observing that one aim of limiting standing is to ensure that some actions are "lost
or misdirected within the federal bureaucracy. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
U.L. REV.88 1,
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
897 (1983); see also Jonathan H . Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKEENVTL.L. & POL'Y F. 39, 44 11.28 (2001) (noting
same).
29 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106-07, (1998); Atl. States
Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.5 (I lth Cir. 1990).
30 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that 'all civil penalties have some deterrent effect' . . . .") (citing Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)).
See 33 U.S.C. $ 1365(a). A number of other environmental statutes include citizen
suit provisions. See 42 U.S.C. $ 9659(a) (2000) (Comprehensive Environmental Response
and Compensation and Liability Act); 16 U.S.C. $ 1540(g) (2000) (Endangered Species
Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 7604 (2000) (Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. 9 2619 (2000) (Toxic Substances Control Act); 30 U.S.C. $ 1270 (2000) (Surface Mining Reclamation and Control
Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 1449 (2000) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 6972 (2000) (Solid
Waste Disposal Act). The one major environmental statute without a citizen suit provision
is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. $ 136 (1994).
32 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33 U.S.C. $9 1251-1387 (2000).
ul Id. 9 l365(a)(l).
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Having one's interests adversely affected is not the same as suffering
While one's interests and oneself may overlap, they are not
an
identical. Interests are inherently subjective and not necessarily bounded
by geography or even logic. I have never visited the Tongass Forest in
Alaska, for example, nor do I have any plans to do so. Nevertheless, I am
deeply interested in its preservation. If a logging concern in the Tongass
were to discharge effluents in excess of its permitted maximum, my interests would be adversely affected.
The language of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision (as well
as its legislative history) suggests that I should be able to sue. The Court,
however, has repeatedly held otherwise, finding that prospective plaintiffs
must allege a cognizable injury-in-fact in order to file suit. This requirement holds true irrespective of the statute's purpose or the wording of its
citizen suit provision.36 That injury must be shown through, at a minimum, the defendant's behavior adversely impacting either the plaintiff's
current use of an area or the plaintiff's specific plans to do so.37Consequently, there is a disjuncture between the Court's requirements for legal
injury and the language of the Act, which requires only a violation and
an interested plaintiff.
This disjuncture stems from the ancillary role of injury to the enforcement of the statute as written. The Clean Water Act's drafters focused on the existence of violations, not on h a d i n j u r y either to the environment or to prospective plaintiffs, as the criteria for standing.38Thus,
the dispute in Laidlaw over the right to sue under the Clean Water Act bears
little relation to the actual language of the statute. Instead, the Court's
framing of the issue effectively rewrites a key provision of the law. Putting aside the disturbing separation of power implications of such behavior, the Court's apparent ability to fashion its own criteria for justiciability also raises serious questions about the basis for judicial decision-making.
One of the principal causes of the rhetorical problems in the law is
that the concept of harm39to the environment is meaningless. Harm, the
foundation of legal injury, derives from traditional property interests.
With ownership comes the accompanying notion that one's property
should be protected from damage or trespass by others. By contrast, the
environment is a type of commons: no one owns it. It is made up of "the
surrounding conditions, influences, or forces, which influence or modify"

See infra Part 1II.B. 1.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737,755 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).
37 See, e.g., Lujan,504 U.S. at 564; Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 183-84 (2000).
38 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
39 Though the Laidlaw court uses harm and injury interchangeably, whenever possible
this Article uses injury to refer to humans and harm to refer to the nonhuman.
35
36
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humans.40 Those circumstances vary with individual perspective and are
not things in which one can hold an ownership i n t e r e ~ t . ~Without
'
an
owner, there can be neither trespass nor a controlling point of view through
which to assess damage. Therefore, the "environment," as such, is incompatible with traditional notions of harm, as well as with the body of
law designed to protect private property.
Standing doctrine represents the Court's attempt to elide this incompatibility. Unfortunately, its conclusion that standing for a private right of
action to enforce environmental laws (i.e., the Clean Water Act) hinges
on injury to the plaintiff only complicates the issue further.
The Clean Water Act's abiding goal is to protect waterways held in
common by the citizens of the nation.42 Its citizen suit provision allows
for a private right of action when pollutants are discharged into those
waterways. It is hard to see how injury to individual plaintiffs fits into
this regulatory framework, or why it should.43 Requiring injury to plaintiffs as a prerequisite for standing amounts to inserting an extra-statutory
provision into the Act, and allows the Court to conform its environmental
rulings to private property-based doctrines as well as to the exigencies of
the federal docket. In this respect, even while invoking Article 111, the
Court appears to be imposing a prudential standing requirement both as a
rationale and as a means for overriding the statute's instructions.
Prudential standing stems from courts implementing "'prudential'
factors, not by virtue of their inherent authority to expand or constrict
standing, but rather as a set of presumptions derived from common-law
tradition designed to determine whether a legal right exists."44 Issues
giving rise to prudential standing concerns include, for example, whether
the alleged injury is specific to the plaintiff or a widely shared social grievand whether a particular plaintiff may properly assert the rights of
a third party.46
WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
856 (2d ed. 1939)
Paul Wapner describes nature (which he uses interchangeably with environment) as
"not a single realm with a universalized meaning, but a canvas on which we project our
sensibilities, our culture, and our ideas about what is socially necessary." Paul Wapner,
Leftist Criticism of "Nature": Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age, DISSENT
MAG., Winter 2003, at 71, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/
wi03/wapnechtm.
42 See 33 U.S.C. 5 125 1(a) (2000).
43 See Sunstein, Whar's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 1, at 209-23.
Scalia, supra note 28, at 886.
45 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987) (discussing the "zone of interest" requirement as an additional prudential principle necessitating that it be reasonably
foreseeable that the plaintiff would benefit from the legislation); Air Courier Conference of
Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-31 (1991) (applying Clarke to deny
standing when the benefit to the plaintiff from the statute was fortuitous).
46 See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
41
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Normally, courts invoke prudential standing to determine whether
plaintiffs have a cause of action in the absence of a clear statutory direcThe problem with doing so here is that there is a clear statutory
directive. The Act's language is lucid and unequivocal. When an entity
violates the statute's effluent standards or limitations, interested (not injured) citizens may sue. Yet statutory citizen suit provisions do not easily
conform to the Court's private property-based methods for measuring
harm and thereby defining cases and controversies. The resulting tension
between Congress's willingness to confer a private right of action to enforce environmental statutes and the Court's unwillingness to recognize
the scope of that conferral has created a jurisprudence that is confused,
confusing, and potentially detrimental to the national trust.

A. Facts

Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. ("Laidlaw") purchased
a commercial wastewater treatment plant in South Carolina. The South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") issued Laidlaw a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water
authorizing the discharge
of limited amounts of pollutants, including mercury, into the North Tyger
River.49Laidlaw's subsequent effluent discharges of numerous pollutants,
especially mercury, repeatedly exceeded permissible amounts.50
In April 1992, Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environmental Action Network, Inc. (hereinafter referred to, along with the Sierra Club which joined the action at a later date, as "Friends of the Earth"
or "FOE") notified Laidlaw of their intent to sue under the Clean Water
Act immediately upon the expiration of a mandatory sixty-day waiting
peri~d.~
Following
'
this notification, Laidlaw invited the DHEC to file suit
against it.52 The DHEC acquiesced and Laidlaw's attorney then drafted
the complaint and paid the filing fee.53On the final day of the sixty-day
waiting period, Laidlaw and the DHEC reached a settlement wherein Laidlaw paid $100,000 in civil penalties and agreed to "make every effort" to
comply with its permit obligation^.^^

See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 252.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
49 See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 176 (2000).
50See Luidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 600, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997) (noting that Laidlaw
47

48

violated the mercury limits of the permit 489 times between 1987 and 1995).
5 1 See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 176; 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000).
52 See Laidlaw IV. 528 U.S. at 176.
53 See id. at 176-77.
54 See id. at I77 (citing Luidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. 470, 479-81 (D.S.C. 1995)).
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By inviting the DHEC to file suit and then reaching a quick settlement, Laidlaw sought to abrogate FOE's ability to sue. The Clean Water
Act precludes citizen suits alleging violations that have already been the
subject of a state enforcement action.55In June 1992, FOE filed suit anyway, alleging that Laidlaw was committing ongoing violations and that
the DHEC enforcement action had not been "diligently prosecuted" in
the manner required by the Act.56 The group sought injunctive and declaratory relief.57 In asserting its standing, several members of FOE
claimed that they had been injured because they no longer used the river
for fishing, camping, swimming, or canoeing due to fears of the river's
pollution and an aversion to its smell and a p p e a r a n ~ eLocal
. ~ ~ homeowners testified that the pollution had decreased the value of their property,
while other witnesses stated that the pollution had caused them to abandon their plans to purchase homes near the river.59After the suit was filed
but prior to judgment, Laidlaw violated its discharge permit thirteen
more times and committed an additional thirteen monitoring and ten reporting ~iolations.~'
In a nuanced holding, the district court found for the plaintiffs but
deliberately did not predicate its holding on any finding of damage to the
river.61Indeed, the court found that the river had suffered no ecological
harm from Laidlaw's d i s ~ h a r g e s Nevertheless,
.~~
it imposed a civil penalty of $405,800 and awarded attorneys' fees to FOE, while declining to
award injunctive or declaratory relief.'j3 In explaining its decision not to
award equitable relief, the court observed that the combined deterrent
effect of the penalty and fee award should serve to forestall future violations. In addition, the court noted that injunctive relief would serve little
purpose since Laidlaw had recently come into substantial compliance
with its permit obligation^.^^
FOE appealed as to the amount of the judgment but did not challenge
the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief.65 Laidlaw cross-appealed, arguing that FOE lacked standing and that the DHEC's enforcement action

55 Laidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. at 478 (noting that Laidlaw's intent in soliciting the suit by
DHEC was to bar FOE's proposed citizen suit); see 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B).
56See 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (precluding citizen suits under the Clean Water Act
when "the State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil . . . action in a court
of the . . . State to require compliance").
57 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 167.
58 See id. at 182-83.
59 See id. at 182.
See id. at 178.
See Laidlaw 11,956 F. Supp. 588,601-03 (D.S.C. 1997).
62 See id. at 602 ("[Tlhe . . . permit violations at issue in this citizen suit did not result
in any health risk or environmental harm.").
Id. at 603-1 1 .
@See id. at 61 I .
65 See Laidlaw 111, 149 F.3d 303, 305-06 (4th Cir. 1998).
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precluded the lawsuit.66The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss, holding, inter alia, that even assuming FOE had standing, the case was moot since Laidlaw had subsequently come into full compliance and because FOE had not appealed the
denial of equitable relief.67The absence of equitable relief meant that the
plaintiffs had won only civil penalties and, since those penalties were
paid to the government rather than to the plaintiffs, the court found insufficient redress to satisfy the requirements for standing.68FOE appealed
and the Supreme Court granted ~ e r t i o r a r i . ~ ~
The issues before the Supreme Court included whether FOE had
standing to bring the suit and, if so, whether the case had been mooted.
The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, finding that FOE had standing and
that the case was not moot.70As noted previously, it held that the relevant
showing for standing involves injury to the plaintiff rather than harm to
the en~ironment.~'
In this instance, FOE demonstrated sufficient injury
through affidavits and testimony showing that Laidlaw's discharges adversely impacted affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic interest~.~~T
injuries
he
alleged were sufficiently concrete and particularized to
satisfy the requirements set forth in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federat i ~ and
n ~Lujan
~ v. Defenders of Wildlife.74In addition, the deterrent effect
provided by the civil penalties constituted sufficient redress.75
The Court further held that the case was not moot because voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not generally deprive a court of
its ability to rule on the legality of that practice.76Laidlaw did not meet
its burden of showing that the challenged behavior could not reasonably
be expected to recur.77The district court's refusal to grant equitable relief
did not indicate a conclusion that there was no possibility of future violations. It showed only that, in that court's view, the civil penalties and

67

See id. at 305.
See id. at 3 0 6 4 7 .

68

Id.

69

See 525 U.S. 1176 (1999) (No. 98-822).

66

Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 195 (2000).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
72 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 183 (holding injury adequately alleged when plaintiffs state
that they use the affected area and that the "'aesthetic and recreational values of the area
will be lessened' by the challenged activity") (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 735 (1972)).
7 3 497 U.S. 87 1 (1990).
74 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
75 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 185 ("The legislative history of the [Clean Water] Act reveals that Congress wanted the district court to consider the need for retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution, when it imposed civil penalties . . . . [The district court
may] seek to deter future violations by basing the penalty on its economic impact.")
(quoting Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412,422-23 (1987)).
76 See id. (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)).
77See id. (citing U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968)).
70

71
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attorney's fees constituted a sufficient deterrent, rendering other relief
unneces~ary.'~

B. Harm Under Laidlaw
There are a number of interesting and important threads to this case,
but this Article confines the discussion to the majority's fundamental disagreement with the dissent over what constitutes harm for purposes of
standing. While the disagreement in Laidlaw arises with respect to the
Clean Water Act, the issues raised are generally applicable to environmental jurisprudence.
I do not suggest that the Court's holding itself is wrong; as Lord Mansfield noted, decisions are more often right than the reasons behind them.79
Not only do I believe that the majority reached the proper conclusion
(albeit through convoluted reasoning), I also believe the dissent's position to be far more pernicious to the letter and intent of the Clean Water
Act as well as to the broader notion of environmental protection.
Even while acknowledging the fundamental accuracy of the majority's statement that standing hinges on injury to the plaintiff rather than
harm to the environment (a concession that is itself troubling given the
illogic of its assertion regarding harm),80the dissent attempts to build into
the statute a requirement of empirical, conventionally understood injury
to an individual plaintiff. This criterion is tellingly absent from the statute as written8' and, if adopted, would rewrite the law to make it even
more difficult for citizens to exercise their statutorily conferred right to
sue. Inevitably, this would make it more unlikely that violators of the
Clean Water Act would be prosecuted or deterred. Unfortunately, however, the majority opinion-though properly critical of the dissent's positions2-adds to the woes of environmental jurisprudence by muddling
even further the already artificial boundary between environmental harm
and individual injury.

Id. at 185-86.
Specifically, Lord Mansfield is reputed to have said: "Decide promptly, but never
give any reasons. Your decisions may be right, but your reasons are sure to be wrong."
Steven Wright, The Quotations Home Page, http://www.theotherpages.org/quote-02b.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8' See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 960-61
(1998)
82 See, e.g., Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 188 n.4.
78

79
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1. Laidlaw Artijcially Distinguishes Injury to Individuals from
Harm to the Environment
The Laidlaw majority decrees that no harm need occur to the environment for a citizen suit to lie.83 Consequently, a plaintiff's injuryfor
purposes of standing under the Act need not arise from actual harm to the
affected waterway. This is congruent with the language of the statute, which
permits citizen suits based on violations of any conditions of NPDES
permits, even if those violations are strictly p r o ~ e d u r a lIn
.~~
Laidlaw, for
example, the Court acknowledged that the entity's discharges did no cognizable harm to the river even as it found that the plaintiffs' injuries,
which were based on a perceived harm to the river, merited standing.85
From this we may deduce that, if an entity allegedly violates the Act,
prospective plaintiffs need only believe that the waterway suffers harm
and alter their behavior a c ~ o r d i n g l yThat
. ~ ~ belief (along with the alleged
violation) creates the injury that enables standing.87
While the opinion's reasoning seems sound, the distinction it draws
between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment is incoherent.
Harm is a subjective measure of damage. Subjectivity requires a subject-an
entity with a definable conscious perspective. Yet, the environment does not
define itself; w e define the environment. Depending on one's point of
view, the concept of environment can range from the inanimate through
an infinitely complex polyphony of perspective^.^^ In light of this lack of
consensus regarding what the environment is, it is understandable that
attempts to conceive of a judicial framework wherein the environment

83Seeid. at 181.
&lSee 33 U.S.C. 8 1365(f)(6) (2000) (allowing citizen suits that allege violations of
permits or conditions thereof); id. 3 1318 (outlining procedural requirements of permits);
see also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting same). .
Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 181.
86See id. at 181-183; Adler, supra note 28, at 5 6 ("The harm recognized by the Court
was the lessening of the 'aesthetic and recreational values of the area' brought about by
nothing more than the plaintiffs' beliefs that the repeated violation of NPDES permits had
a significant environmental impact.").
87 See Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 115 1 (citing Laidlaw and finding that "the
threshold question of citizen standing under the CWA is whether an individual can show
that she has been injured in her use of a particular area because of concerns about violations of environmental laws, not whether the plaintiff can show there has been actual environmental harm").
88 For a useful survey of the history of ecology and the linked evolution of the notion
of environment, see DONALDWORSTER,NATURE'SECONOMY:A HISTORYOF ECOLOGICAL
IDEAS(1977). James Lovelock, architect of the Gaia Hypothesis, sees the earth as a selfregulating living whole, with rights that trump those of all its components (including huGAIA:A NEW LOOKAT LIFE ON EARTH124-40 (1979); see
mans). See JAMESLOVELOCK,
THE CREATIVEDISINTEGRATION
OF INDUSalso THEODOREROSZAK,PERSONPLANET:
TRIAL SOCIETY32, 41, 49 (1978); Stephen R. L. Clark, Gaia and the Forms of Life, in
ENVIRONMENTAL
PHILOSOPHY:
A COLLECTION
OF READINGS
182, 188-90 (Robert Elliot &
Arran Gare eds., 1983).
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could achieve legal standing have met with little success.89Not surprisingly, given this variety of perspectives, notions of harm to the environment
also vary greatly. For example, as we will see shortly in Animal Dreams, a
local community's definition of harm to the environment can differ radically from that of the management of a nearby mine. This lack of unanimity
makes the idea of harm to the environment unintelligible as a concept
separate and independent from the person expressing it. Therefore, the
majority's distinction between harm to the environment and injury to the
plaintiff falls prey to radical subjectivity, rendering it meaningless. Even
setting aside its logical flaws, the opinion remains troubling. On a basic,
common sense level, it seems counterintuitive to hold that injury to the
plaintiff determines justiciability under a statute where the stated goal is
environmental protection. Under this formulation, the environment is relegated to a subordinate role within environmental jurisprudence. The plaintiff,
on the other hand, assumes a prominence that belies the statute's language.
This de-emphasis of the environment is not a new development, nor
is Laidlaw the most glaring instance of it. For the last decade or more,
the Court's cases have consistently marginalized the environment while
elevating the importance of the perceived woes of the humans litigating
under environmental statutesg0This trend occurred despite the fact that
the stated aim of laws from the Clean Water Act through the Endangered
Species Act9' is the protection of the e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~
89 This is not to say that there have not been admirable attempts to do so. See, e.g.,
Stone, supra note 11, at 464-73 (arguing that the resource itself could be given standing
with a guardian ad litem appointed to represent its interests); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not
to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALEL.J. 1315,
1345 (1974) (suggesting that a spirit of "moral evolution" had recently spread to include
African Americans and women and could one day include canyons, mountains and seaE. STONE,EARTHA N D OTHERETHICS:THE CASEFOR MORALPLUshores); CHRISTOPHER
RALISM (1987) (revising and reworking the notion of standing for trees); Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan?, supra note 11, at 232-34 (suggesting that Congress create a bounty
for prospective environmental plaintiffs, thus enabling them to meet the injury-in-fact requirement); see also Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1 1, at 1335 (arguing that it
is perfectly conceivable and practicable for Congress to confer standing to animals);
RODERICKFRAZIERNASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE:A HISTORYOF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS6-7 (1989) (noting the historical tradition of extending rights to oppressed minorities from the Magna Carta through the Endangered Species Act).
90 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (noting that acquiring standing will become "substantially more difficult" if the plaintiff "is not himself
the object of the government action or inaction he challenges"). Justice Scalia, the opinion's author, first previewed these views in an article published shortly after he was named
to the federal bench. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 894 (asserting that standing should be
infrequently available when "the plaintiff is complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to
impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else"); see also Carlson, supra note 81,
at 935 (acknowledging the trend toward human-centered environmental jurisprudence,
arguing for a human-centered standing requirement, and noting that a stringent injury-infact requirement will "require environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate why an environmental resource matters to real people").
91 16 U.S.C. $5 1531-1544 (2000).
92 According to the declaration of goals and policy that open the Clean Water Act, "it
is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated
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The Court's elevation of the plaintiff at the expense of the environment effectively turns the citizen suit provision into an extension of nuisance law. Under the common law, nuisance doctrine offers remedies to
landowners who have been injured as a result of damage to their property. To attain standing under the common law, landowners must demonstrate that the nuisance complained of is a private nuisance-that the
damages claimed are particular to an individual or small group. By contrast, only an agent of the state (or, if other criteria are met, members of a
class action) has standing to sue to abate a "public" nuisance, wherein
the damages involve a large number of people.93
Rather than focus on the statute's conferral of standing to any party
intending to enforce the Act, the Laidlaw holding seems to replace it
with an expanded availability of standing to abate public nuisance. Instead of determining whether the statute has been violated, the operative
issue becomes whether a private plaintiff can show that she has been
cognizably damaged. While there is arguably a place for the expansion of
private rights of action for public nuisance, there is no legal basis for instituting it at the expense of the statute's directive.
The Laidlaw dissent's use of the term "environmental plaintiff' implicitly highlights the tortured reasoning underlying this collision of
standing doctrine and environmental law. The dissent (authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas) states that: "[tlypically, an environmental plaintiff . . . argues that the discharges harm the environment, and that the harm to the environment injures him."" Under this
formulation, the justiciability of the case hinges not on whether a defendant violated a legal duty to refrain from polluting, but rather on whether
the defendant injured the "environmental plaintiff' serving as the environment's proxy. By the Court's own reasoning, a plaintiff's injury can
exist or not exist wholly independently of any harm to the environment;
thus it strains logic to posit that a human plaintiff's interests mirror those
of the environment. In this context, there is no such thing as an "environmental plaintiff." The term is a convenient legal fiction.95
by 1985." 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) (2000). The Endangered Species Act aims "to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species . . . ." 16 U.S.C. ?j1531(b). Virtually every major
environmental statute contains a comparable statement of goals.
93 See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS?j 821C (1979) (noting that one must have
either suffered a different kind of harm than others exercising the same public right, be a
public official, or be a member of a class action in order to sue for the abatement of a public nuisance).
94 Luidlaw ZV,528 U.S. 167, 199 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 Professor Carlson sees this as a non-issue, arguing that a "human-centered standing
requirement" works in the environment's favor because
[i]f potential audiences for environmental litigants-judges, juries, members of
the media . . .--find a closer focus on the human relationship with the resource
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2. Judicial Standing Doctrine EfSectively Amends and Distorts
Environmental Statutes

The majority affirmed the existence of the plaintiffs' injury despite
the district court's finding that the river had not been harmed by the disc h a r g e ~ The
. ~ ~ injury arose because Laidlaw's mercury discharges purportedly interfered with several FOE members' ability to pursue recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests on the river. The presence or
absence of harm to the river did not factor into the district court's analysis of the standing e q ~ a t i o n . ~Plaintiffs
'
believed that the discharges
harmed the river and consequently injured them as well. In essence,
plaintiffs were injured because they believed they had been injured (a
rhetorically powerful reflexivity).
The dissent argues that because the district court found no harm to
the environment and because FOE'S affidavits of injury were therefore, of
necessity, vague, FOE lacked standing.98 In Justice Scalia's view, the
supposed injuries arising from plaintiffs' belief that the river was polluted
did not reach the level of "concrete and particularized" injury that the
law requires.99He further noted the absence of any hard data that might
indicate decreased home values, declining recreational usage, or some
other quantifiable injury.'""
The dissent grudgingly acknowledges that the assertion by the majority that the relevant showing for standing is injury to the plaintiff
rather than harm to the environment is "correct, as far as it g o e ~ . " ' Nev~'
ertheless the dissent maintains that "[iln the normal course . . . a lack of
demonstrable harm to the environment will translate, as it plainly does
here, into a lack of demonstrable harm to citizen plaintiff^.""'^ According
to the dissent, "[s]ubjective apprehensions," absent any empirical evimore persuasive, the recent Supreme Court standing decisions may actually improve the effectiveness of litigation as a tool for environmental protection . . . .
Such a change in focus could, in turn, help environmental groups reach beyond
their traditional constituencies to people who have not previously considered
themselves environmentalists.
Carlson, supra note 81, at 935-36. While I am skeptical that tighter standing requirements
will win any converts to environmentalism or to the plaintiffs' side in environmental litigation, I do believe that a greater emphasis on the human bringing the suit inevitably diminishes the role of the environment in the suit. This in turn degrades the overall purpose of
the statute, namely environmental protection.
%See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 181 (quoting Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 602-03
(D.S.C. 1997) ("All available data . . . fail to show that Laidlaw's actual discharges have
resulted in harm to the North Tyger River.").
97 See Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. at 600 (noting that the "overall quality of the river exceeds levels necessary to support . . . recreation").
98 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 198-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"See id. at 198 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
'"See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 199-200 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
lo' Id. at 199.
Iu2 Id.
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dence, are legally insufficient and "accepting them even in the face of a
finding that the environment was not demonstrably harmed . . . makes the
injury-in-fact requirement a sham."'03 In other words, the dissent argues,
though harm to the environment is not required by the law, courts should
require it nonetheless.lW
If it had been adopted, this formulation would have effectively written a new provision into the Clean Water Act. Such action is necessary,
the dissent contends, in order to keep standing doctrine from devolving
into farce.Io5The Court's failure to adopt this position means that, "if there
are permit violations, and a member of a plaintiff environmental organization lives near the offending plant, it,would be difficult not to satisfy
today's lenient standard."Io6 In the dissent's view, this is a dangerously
expansive precedent, even though it amounts to no more than the statute's
language explicitly allows, and is considerably less expansive than what
the statute's drafters intended.lo7
Id. at 20 1.
Indeed, as discussed in supra text accompanying note 36, the statute requires neither a showing of harm to the environment nor harm to the plaintiff. See 33 U.S.C.
9 1365(a)(l) (2000):
Io3
IM

[Alny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf( I ) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter. . . .
See also Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM.J. ENVTL.L. 169 (1997):

[Tlhe Congress [in enacting the Clean Water Act] adopted a blanket prohibition on
all discharges of pollutants, whether or not the discharge caused any dernonstrable harm to the receiving water body, except and unless the discharge was authorized
by (and in compliance with) a permit issued in accordance with its provisions.
Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
Io5
See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
lC6
Id.
'07 See ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYDIV. OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICEOF
THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS,
9 3 CONG.,
~ ~ A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF THE WATERPOLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972 221 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].Senator Muskie stated that under the citizen suit provision as drafted

I would presume that a citizen of the United States, regardless of residence, would
have an interest as defined in this bill regardless of the location of the waterway
and regardless of the issue involved.
Id.

Senator Bayh then commented:
[Tlhe conference provision will not prevent any person or group with a legitimate
concern about water quality from bringing suit against those who violate the act
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Though flawed, the dissent nevertheless raises crucial problems with
the majority's reasoning. For example, it correctly points out that the injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine is a sham. It bears noting,
however, that Laidlaw did not make this so. In actuality, the Laidlaw
majority's conclusion that belief rather than actual injury is all that is
required for standing merely validates what Judge William Fletcher has
long argued-that
a genuine belief in an injury having occurred comprises actual injury, and that to claim otherwise is to attach external normative requirements to an ostensibly factual inquiry.los Consequently, the
voluminous prose that the Court has produced as part of its ongoing efforts to codify the concept of factual injury has only served to obfuscate
an inherently unworkable notion.lW
C . Injury to the Plaintiff-The

Implications of a Judge-Made Law

The Laidlaw majority appears to recognize that its holding effectively amends the Clean Water Act, and purposely mitigates the impact of
this amendment by relaxing the requirements for a showing of harm. Its
finding that a belief in an injury's having occurred is equivalent to an
actual injury expands the definition of injury to the point of irrelevance.
Assuming a plaintiff is not lying, belief in an injury is always an actual
injury.l1° Yet, even as it tempers the impact of its judge-made amendment
o r a permit, or against the Administrator if he fails to perform a non discretionary
act.
Id.
Io8 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 231 ("[Tlhe 'injury in fact' requirement cannot be
applied in a non-normative way."); Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 11, at 1352
("[It is important] to recognize that the legal system is denying thzt people suffer injury in
fact for reasons that involve not facts but judgments about what facts, and what harms,
ought to count for legal purposes.").
Iw The Court itself has acknowledged that its rulings on standing have been less than
clear. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464,475 (1982):

We need not mince words when we say that the concept of "Art. 111 standing" has
not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by
this Court . . . nor when we say that this very fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition.
See also Fletcher, supra note 11 (reviewing the lack of clarity in standing jurisprudence);
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1432
(1988) (discussing the development of standing doctrine); Fallon, supra note 11 (noting
that the Court's standing doctrine is particularly problematic with respect to public law
litigation).
"Osee Fletcher, supra note 11, at 231 ("There cannot be a merely factual determination whether a plaintiff has been injured except in the relatively trivial sense of determining whether plaintiff is telling the truth about her sense of injury."); Sunstein, Standing for
Animals, supra note 11, at 1352 ("[Tlhe legal system is denying that people suffer injury in
fact for reasons that involve not facts but judgments about what facts, and what harms,
ought to count for legal purposes.").
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to the statute, the Court undermines the Act's substantive language. If a
plaintiff must show injury to herself in o r d e ~to enforce a statute designed
to protect the nation's waterways, then there exists a fundamental disconnect between the statute's purpose and the Court's interpretation of it.Ii1
Laidlaw is by no means an isolated example of this phenomenon.
The Court has faced similar dilemmas on numerous other occasions. In
Sierra Club v. M o r t ~ n , "for
~ example, the Sierra Club sought to enjoin
the Walt Disney Corporation from developing a ski resort in a section of
the Sequoia National Forest that lay adjacent to Sequoia National Park.
The complaint alleged that the development "would destroy or otherwise
adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of
the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future generat i o n ~ " "and
~ that the Club was therefore entitled to standing under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").114While acknowledging that such allegations can theoretically comprise legal injury, the
Court nevertheless denied standing on the grounds that the Sierra Club
had neither claimed economic injury"5 nor had any of its members alleged that they would be otherwise affected by the development.Ii6
Morton merits attention here not because the holding was necessarily wrong, but rather because it offers one of the first and best examples
of the Court defining legal injury in the environmental context to require
specific and articulable injury to the plaintiff.Ii7Sometimes, as in Morton,
the language of the statute (in this case, the APA) suggests that injury to
the plaintiff is necessary for standing.'I8 Other times, as with the Clean
Water Act and other environmental statutes, nothing in the text of the
statute supports such an inference.
The Clean Water Act confers standing on all "persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affe~ted.""~
Elsewhere the Act refers
to "any interested person."120Courts have found no discernable difference
between these two terms. In fact, according to the D.C. Circuit, both phrases
incorporate the injury-in-fact rule set forth in Morton.''' While a finding

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Il2405 U.S. 727 (1972).
[ I 3 Id. at 734.
' I 4 5 U.S.C. 99 55 1-559.
I l 5 See Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
I l 6 See id. at 734-41.
For other examples, see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
) I 8 5 U.S.C. 9 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.") (emphasis added).
' I 9 33 U.S.C. 8 1365 (a),(g) (2000).
33 U.S.C. 5 1369(b).
I z 1 See Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Ii1
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that there is no discernable difference between these two terms is itself
worthy of discussion, the matter becomes even more curious when one
considers the language of Morton that the terms supposedly incorporate.
Morton, in interpreting the APA's requirement that prospective plaintiffs suffer legal wrong or be adversely affected by agency action, finds
that the "party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected."lZ2In contrast, the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision requires only an allegation that one's interests were adversely
affected. The difference in the language of the two statutes involves more
than mere semantics; there is an important distinction between one's interests and oneself. Yet, even though the plain meaning of the statutes'
wording should control,123these discrete concepts of interest and selfhood are lumped together under a general requirement that an "environmental plaintiff' must allege injury to herself. This seems simply wrong.
The Morton Court went out of its way to note that in order to merit
standing, an affected interest must rise to the level of injury1"-but also
acknowledged that not every negatively affected interest amounts to an
injury.Iz5Rather, an affected interest becomes an injury when the threat to
that interest is "actual and imminent."lZ6Those criteria are met, for example, when a plaintiff demonstrates concrete plans to visit the area
where the proposed violation is occurring.12' Even when they do not rise
to the level of injury, the Court recognized that affected interests can and
do exist.128
Thus, under the Court's reasoning, having one's interests detrimentally affected can-but need not-amount to an injury to oneself. It follows
that while one's interests and oneself overlap, they are not one and the same.
The Clean Water Act grants standing to prospective plaintiffs whose
interests are affected; there is nothing in its language to suggest that those
affected interests must have metamorphosed into an injury.Iz9Neverthe405 U.S. at 740.
I2'See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223,228 (1993) ("When a word is not defined by
statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.").
lZ4 See 405 U.S. at 738 ("[Blroadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.").
IZ5 Id. at 738-39 (noting that mere interest in a problem is not sufficient to render an
individual or organization sufficiently aggrieved to merit standing).
lZ6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) ("[Ilntentions-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be--do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require.").
lz7 See id.
lZ8 See id. at 563 (1992) (demanding that plaintiffs must show they would be injured by
defendant's action over and above demonstrating a "special interest" in the subject).
lZ9 While there is some discussion in the legislative history averring that the Clean
Water Act's citizen suit provision is based on Section 10 of the APA and the Morton
Court's interpretation thereof, see LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,supra note 107, at 249-50 (remarks of Congressman Dingell), the statute's language does not bear this out. If the draftIz2
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less, despite, clear statutory language and its own cases setting out the
difference between interests and injuries, the Court continues to conflate
the two.
When one considers that statutory interpretation is nothing if not attentive to nuance and that a court's reading of a statute can turn on matters as subtle as the choice of conjunction, this willingness to disregard a
key difference in statutory phrasing seems both puzzling and at loggerheads with the Court's traditional j u r i s p r ~ d e n c e . As
' ~ ~Justice Frankfurter
liked to say, the three cardinal rules of statutory interpretation are: "(1) Read
the Statute; (2) read the Statute; (3) read the Statute!"13'
Having effectively disregarded Justice Frankfurter's admonition and
created a line of cases that require injury to the plaintiff in addition to an
alleged statutory violation, the Court must periodically face the unenviable task of determining what type of injury to the plaintiff constitutes legal
harm. If, for example, the sight of a river running murky makes a person
feel unhappy, would that be legal injury for purposes of the Clean Water
Act under the Court's definition? It would be hard to argue that the injury
is not genuine where the plaintiff's unhappiness is heartfelt and sincere.
But is her injury sufficient to state a cause of action? The Court's past
precedent offers little encouragement for such a
Yet, under Laid'

ers of the Clean Water Act had meant to follow the APA, it would have been a simple
matter to simply incorporate its language awarding standing to any person "suffering legal
wrong" or "adversely affected or aggrieved." 5 U.S.C. 8 701(6) (2000). Instead, the Clean
Water Act speaks of persons whose interests (rather than their person(s)) were affected. 33
U.S.C. 5 1369(b)(l) (2000). The legislative history also chronicles a colloquy between
Senators Bayh and Muskie suggesting that the chosen language in the bill was meant only
to track the Morton Court's finding that an affected interest may "reflect aesthetic, conservational and recreational as well as economic values" rather than the need for personal
injury to a plaintiff. LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,supra note 107, at 221.
I3O See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."); De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 572-78 (1956) (contrasting disjunctive and conjunctive readings
of key provisions of the Copyright Act).
13' Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX
T H EJUDGE3 0 , 3 6 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
FRANKFURTER:
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (finding plaintiff's claims that they had visited area and intended to do so again inadequate for standing
because they failed to demonstrate specific concrete plans to visit the area again and thus did
not show "actual or imminent" injury). Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),
cited in Laidlaw IV by both the majority, see 528 U.S. at 188 n.4, and dissent, see id. at
203-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting), offers another excellent (non-environmental) example of
the difficulty such cases present. In Linda R. S., the mother of an out-of-wedlock child
sued to force a Texas district attorney to enforce the state's child support laws regardless of
the marital status of the parents. 410 U.S. at 614-15. The Court held that she lacked
standing because there was no "direct relationship" between the alleged injury and the
claim sought to be adjudicated. Id. at 618. Because the suit, if successful, would not result
in the payment of child support, Linda R. S.'s injury was not cognizable. Id. Since Linda
R. S. did not sue for child support, but rather for equal protection violations, the Court's
ruling-rather than hinging on redressability-seems to hinge on whether equal protection
violations fall within the zone of interest of Texas child support laws. The Court's holding
suggests that they do not.
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law, her injury should suffice, even if the river's murkiness did not result
from the violation itself. As long as an entity violated the Act in some
fashion and the plaintiff believes that the violation caused the murky
water, then her resulting despondency would seem to constitute legal injury and her citizen suit should lie.
While it seems unlikely that the Court would allow standing in the
above scenario, it is not clear on what grounds standing would be denied.
Having to consistently fashion fact-specific rules to determine whether an
alleged injury is standing-worthy is a burden the Court has brought upon
itself. Furthermore, insistence on injury to the plaintiff is a requirement
of the Court's own design, a design it claims is necessary to satisfy Article III.133
Article I11 requires a justiciable case or controversy, which over the
years the Court has interpreted to mean adverse litigants with personal
stakes in the outcome.134The idea that this personal stake must be an "injury-in-fact" dates from the Court's 1970 decision in Ass'n of Data ProcAs Fletcher has explained, this
essing Service Organizations v.
requirement has served only to confuse, rather than clarify, the meaning
of case or controversy.136
For its part, the Clean Water Act enables the creation of discharge
limits ostensibly to protect waterways (not plaintiffs) from harm.I3' There
is no dispute that Laidlaw exceeded those limits. According to the district
court, Laidlaw violated its permit no fewer than 489 times.I3*Nevertheless, the court found that the river had not been harmed. While this
finding did not derail FOE'S lawsuit (the statute does not specifically require that a waterway be harmed for a violation to have occurred139)it did
create a dilemma for the court.
The Court's quandary may be summarized as follows: The Clean
Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants into waterways. Pollutants must be harmful or they would not be p01lutants.l~~
Yet, the Court
133 See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979)
("In order to satisfy Art. 111, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.
Otherwise the exercise of federal jurisdiction 'would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent
with the Art. 111 limitation."') (citations omitted) (quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
'"See Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure . . . concrete adverseness

. . . ?'.).
135 397

U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
136SeeFletcher, supra note 11, at 230-34 (arguing that since anyone who honestly
claims to be injured is in fact injured, the injury-in-fact requirement is a disguised normative inquiry and the requirement itself is incoherent).
I3'See 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(a) (2000) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
13* See Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997).
See supra note 9 0 and accompanying text.
'"See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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simultaneously finds Laidlaw liable for the discharge of pollutants even
as it finds that those pollutants did no harm. While it is true that the potential to cause harm can qualify a substance as a pollutant, this definition
contains its own set of problems, as we shall shortly see. In an attempt to
resolve the issue while yet maintaining allegiance to its tortured standing
doctrine, the Court demands a showing of injury (however attenuated) to
the plaintiff instead of harm to the waterway. That injury, according to
the Court, arises from the fact that those who live near and use the river
think that Laidlaw's discharges have harmed the river. Thus, for purposes
of Article 111, the case or controversy stems from plaintiffs' mistaken
perception that the river has been harmed.
According to Laidlaw, then, even though the plant violated the CWA
489 times, the cause of action under the Act survives only because plaintiffs (mistakenly) believe that the river was harmed. As a matter of both
law and policy, this approach seems convoluted and counterproductive.
The statute prohibits discharges into waterways in excess of permitted
limits. If the goal is to deter such discharges and the statute contains a
private right of action to enable enforcement, why require plaintiffs to
assert injuries to themselves-injuries that, under Laidlaw, may or may
not have an empirical link to the alleged violation-in order to sue?
The Court has yet to come to grips with the dissonance within its
rhetoric and reasoning that this approach creates. When the Clean Water
Act explicitly confers a private right of action in the event of its violation, the Court's demand for a further showing of harm (whether to the
plaintiff or to the environment) imposes an extra-statutory requirement
cloaked in the protective rhetoric of Article 111. Perhaps more important,
however, the Court does not define harm in either context. As a result, it
must contort both the English language and its own precedent to find that
injury (or harm) can exist under the Clean Water Act even when there is
apparently no harm (or injury) to the very object that the Act was
adopted to protect.
IV.

SYSTEMS
THEORY
A N D HARM:
A LOOKAT THE TRAILSMELTER
ARBITRATION
A N D ANIMAL
DREAMS

Even though it complicates standing doctrine, distinguishing between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment nevertheless
seems useful for clarifying the nature and severity of a claimed injury. It
is not. Harm is subjective; one person's harm is another person's boon. In
a nation rife with controversy over everything from roads in national forests to offshore drilling to tax cuts to genetically modified food, one need
not look far for examples of actions that are simultaneously lauded and
demonized by various constituencies. Unless there is a conscious entity
from whose point of view harm can be defined, the term lacks meaning.
Consider, for example, that among the materials the Clean Water Act
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classifies as pollutants (which it elsewhere pledges to eliminate from the
nation's waterways) are biological materials, heat, rock, and sand-all of
which occur naturally in waterway^.'^' This is less a problem with draftsmanship-although
it may be that as well-than with the nature of the
terminology. The subjectivity of terms like harm and pollution renders
them indefinable, making it very difficult to legislate for their control or
avoidance.
Two examples illustrate this problem. The first is the Trail Smelter
Arbitration, an international environmental arbitration between the United
States and Canada that stretched from 1930 through 1941 The second
comes from Barbara Kingsolver's novel, Animal Dreams, a story about a
small town in Arizona fighting to keep its river from being poisoned and
dammed by a local mining ~ 0 n c e r n . Understanding
I~~
the applicability of
these examples as well as the workability of my proposed solution will
require a brief discussion of the mechanics of systems theory.
A. Systems Theory and the Legal System
Systems theory posits that society is a conglomeration of systems-political, legal, educational, and so forth. A system is an organization of
components functioning as a unit to perpetuate the survival of the whole.
Each human is a biological system comprised of many functional subsystems (digestive, nervous, cardiovascular, etc.). Humans are themselves
components of the larger social system, which in turn forms part of an
ecosystem, and so on.'44The social system is "functionally differentiated"its sub-systems are serving specific function^.'^^ All function systems share
a common goal-the survival and reproduction of the larger system.'46The
j 4 ! 33 U.S.C. 5 i362(6) (2000); see also NEILEVERNDEN,
THE SOCIALCREATION
OF
NATURE4-7 (1992) (discussing the "ongoing debate between the accusers and the alleged
perpetrators about what actually constitutes pollution").
1 4 2 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941).
143 Both examples, particularly ANIMAL
DREAMS,
are treated at greater length in DAVID
N. CASSUTO,DRIPPINGDRY:LITERATURE,
POLITICS,A N D WATERI N THE DESERTSOUTHWEST (2001).
I M Luhmann offers this stark appraisal of humanity's place within the larger network
of systems:

It is clear . . . that "constructivism" is a completely new theory of knowledge, a
post-humanistic one. This is not intended maliciously but only to make clear that
the concept "man" (in the singular!), as a designation for the bearer and guarantor
of the unity of knowledge, must be renounced. The reality of cognition is to be
found in the current operations of the various [self-reproducing] systems.
Niklas Luhmann, The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality that Remains
Unknown, in SELFORGANIZATION:
PORTRAIT
OF A SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION
78 (Wolfgang
Krohn et al. eds., 1990).
145 See NIKLAS
LUHMANN,
ESSAYSON SELF-REFERENCE
228-29 (1990).
)*See FRANCISCO
J. VARELA,PRINCIPLES
OF BIOLOGICAL
AUTONOMY13 (1979)
(defining an autopoietic system as one that is both autonomous and continually self-
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legal system is one of many function systems within the larger social system.
The legal system arises from an evolving network of shared expectations within society. It relies on the assumption that our respective expectations of each other are reasonably congruent.I4' When these expectations are undermined, we can no longer predict how our fellow members of the social system will behave. Even more importantly, we can no
longer expect the expectations others will have of
When this happens, the system's functioning is imperiled and social instability r e s ~ 1 t s . I ~ ~
Expectations of expectations can be more colloquially expressed as a
sense of how things "ought" to go.lS0That,in essence, is a norm-a universally recognized expectation of the way things ought to go. While these
expectations are not always realistic or even rational, they do enable human interaction. They are myths that are accepted as if they were true.lS1
Even as we acknowledge the importance of norms to socialstability, it is
important to remember that expectations are fluid. Norms shift as the so-

producing); see also LUHMANN,
supra note 12 (adapting Varela's concept to social systems
and arguing that when system elements are conceived of as communicative acts rather than
bioenergetic entities, the concept of autopoiesis extends to the social domain); WILLIAMR.
PAULSON,THE NOISE OF CULTURE:LITERARY
TEXTSIN A WORLDOF INFORMATION
12127 (1988).
I4'See LUHMANN,
supra note 13, at 30 ("[Clertainty in the expectation of expectations
. . . is much more meaningful than the certainty of fulfilling expectations.").
14* See id. at ix.:
The expectation of expectations is a fundamental feature of stable systems of human action, reducing an otherwise unmanageable range of alternative strategies to
something predictable. Moreover, that expectation of expectations has to be generalised over the greatest number of persons and alternatives for action to provide
the necessary stability.
149

See id. at 4 1:

[Tlhe social system has to supervise and channel the process of disappointments
of expectation-and
this not only to enforce effectively the right expectations
(such as legal norms), but in order to create the possibility of counterfactual, disappointment-prepared and normative expectation in the first place. The expectant
person must be prepared and equipped in case he arrives at a discrepant reality.
He would otherwise not have the courage to expect normatively, and therefore
with determination. The channeling and cooling out of disappointments is part of
the stabilisation of structures.
See id. at 33.
See LUDWIGVON BERTALANFFY,
PERSPECTIVES
ON GENERAL
SYSTEMTHEORY67
(1975). Bertalanffy discusses the suggestion of Hans Vainginger, one of the originators of
systems theory, that such "As-If" constructions are necessary components of a functioning
society. Even "such moral concepts as Freedom, God, Immortality, and Human Dignity are
fictions but nevertheless of immense importance: for we have to behave 'as if' they were
reality . . . . [Tlhe myths of tradition are fictions based on the mythical experiences of man
and later invested in historical narratives." See also CASSUTO,supra note 143, at 123.
I5O
IS1

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 104 2004

20041

Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms

105

cia1 system evolve^.'^' While the legal system relies on a certain amount
of predictability within interaction, there must be adaptability as well.
Though an expectation may be thwarted in a particular instance, that
failure will not affect future expectations. This is because "ought," as a
normative concept, contains an imbedded determination not to learn. The
tendency to adhere to a set of beliefs despite empirical evidence to the
contrary is wholly understandable given the nature of the social system.'53If,
for example, I witness someone running a red light, I do not immediately
discard my belief that people should and will stop at red lights, nor will I
start running them myself. My allegiance to the system's norms signifies
my resolve not to learn from experience. Were my expectations to change
every time someone or something deviated from the norm, those expectations would become so ephemeral as to offer no stability at all. If other
people's expectations became similarly capricious, the normative structure on which society depends would be critically compromised.
Nevertheless, even as I expect everyone to stop for red lights, I know
that not everyone will. The inevitability of disappointment is thus also
built into the concept of expectations. Without the risk of disappointment, expectations would become certainties, creating a world that would
be completely predictable and free of ~ o n t i n g e n c y .This
' ~ ~ is impossible,
of course; disappointments will always occur and expectations of expectations will continue despite them. Norms are therefore counterfactualthey often belie reality.15' Systems must retain this norm-based resistance
to learning even as they adapt to changing realities. Herein lies one of the
principal challenges of the legal system. It must be simultaneously both
predictable and m ~ t a b 1 e . l ~ ~
These characteristics-predictability
and inconsistency-exist
in
delicate counterpoise; their coexistence depends on efficient communiSee LUHMANN,
supra note 13, at 35.
15)SeeEVERNDEN,
supra note 141, at 29-30:
152

[Tlhe tendency to practice the subterfuge of mythmaking is understandable. In
practical terms, it may very well afford us some measure of comfort by legitimating a belief in the certainty of at least a few features of existence and a few
behavioral norms. But in the long run, it solves nothing, and has the added effect
of drastically transforming . . . nature.
See also CASSUTO,
supra note 143, at 123-24.
lS4 See LUHMANN,
supra note 13, at 33 ("[N]ormative expectations signify the determination not to learn from disappointments. The possibility of disappointment is foreseen--one knows oneself to be in a complex and contingent world . . . but is, at the outset,
seen as irrelevant to the expectation [as opposed to cognitive expectations].").
See id. ("[Nlorms are counterfactually stabilised behavioural expecrarions. Their
meaning implies unconditional validity . . . as independent of actual fulfillment o r nonfulfillment.") (emphasis in original).
156 See LUHMANN,
supra note 145, at 237 ("All autopoietic systems have to live with
an inherent improbability: that of combining closure and openness. Legal systems present
a special version of this problem. They have to solve it by combining . . . not-leaning and
learning dispositions.").
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cation within the legal system. That communication is enabled by language. Anything with which the system can communicate is effectively
part of the system. That with which it cannot communicate is not part of
the system but rather forms part of the system's environment.I5' The environment, as a systems-theoretical construct, is akin to the conventional
notion of environment. For the system, the environment is everything that
is not the system. Similarly, for individuals, the environment is the totality of one's circumstances. Under either definition, the environment can
be described as everything that is not the entity itself.
The system's environment makes itself known to the system through
creating disturbance^.'^^ The moment that the disturbance becomes intelligible to the system (i.e., communication between it and the system occurs), the disturbance ceases to be part of its environment and becomes part
of the system. In grasping how to communicate with and create meaning
from a disturbance, the system transforms the disturbance into a known
quantity. In terms of a map, one might picture the environment periodically ceding territory to the system in a border skirmish and then gaining
back other territory e 1 ~ e w h e r e . Thus,
I ~ ~ the communicative act is also one
of incorporation and boundary realignment.
We see then that the system and its environment share a dynamic
border that shifts and flows in response to disruption. A system responds
and adapts to environmental perturbation in a manner designed to ensure
its survival. As the system adapts, it gains complexity, enabling it to better cope with future perturbations. A static environment/system relationship would mean that communication as well as systemic evolution would
stagnate. Stability depends on the system's ability to reproduce and function
both despite and because of ongoing environmental disturbance.IM)
The dynamic border between the system and environment means that
boundary drawing is ongoing, subjective and in constant flux.I6' The act
Is7SeeLUHMANN,
supra note 12, at 29 ("[Olne could say that the environment of the
social system cannot communicate with society."); SERRES,
supra note 8, at 85 ("Nature
lies outside the collectivity, which is why the state of nature remains incomprehensible to
the language invented in and by society."); CASSUTO,supra note 143, at 101 ("[Environment] includes everything with which the system cannot communicate.").
Is8See LUHMANN,
supra note 12, at 29.
Is9
CASSUTO,
supra note 143, at 129 n.8:

The map analogy is not wholly accurate because the system and environment are
not finite. Even as the system grows more complex and gains a little territory from
the environment, s o too does the environment grow more complex and regain its
previous size. A more accurate analogy might be a three-dimensional map with
the system and environment sharing one border but having nothing limiting their
expansion on any other side.
Id. at 102.
Ranulph Glanville and Francisco Varela compare the systemlenvironment distinction to a Mobius strip where "[tlhe edges dissolve BECAUSE the fonns are themselves
continuous-they
re-enter and loop around themselves." "Your Inside is Out and Your
IM

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 106 2004

20041

Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms

of drawing boundaries and defining environment is a self-interested act.'62
The system will designate boundaries conducive to its potential to selfreproduce (i.e., perpetuate itself). Despite the inherent uncertainty of the
process, boundary drawing is crucial to self-definition. It is also an inherently subjective process infused with ideology, and integral to the distribution of power. Thus, when political districts are redrawn, the boundaries are determined by the party in power, and when nations lose wars,
their boundaries are redrawn by the victor. This same phenomenon holds
true at the level of race and even of species.'63
If environments vary with subjectivity, so too must the linked concepts of pollution and environmental protection. As Neil Evernden notes,
pollution "involves questions not only of concentrations but also of consequence~."'~"This observation seems especially apt with respect to
Laidlaw. The majority and dissent differ not with respect to the existence
of pollutants in the waterways, but as to their implications. Missing from
the analysis, however, is any discussion of the meaning of the term "pollutant."
Pollutants do not exist outside of systems; pollution presupposes a
system to p01lute.l~~
Identifying pollutants involves determining that a
foreign presence and potential source of harm exists within the system.'66
Deciding that a substance is a pollutant requires two potentially problematic steps: designating the system's boundaries and defining harm.
In the case of the Clean Water Act, the statute was enacted to protect
the nation's waterways from ~ontamination.'~~
The amount of mercury that
Outside is In" (Beatles, (1968)),in 2 APPLIEDSYSTEMS
A N D CYBERNETICS:
PROCEEDINGS
INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS
ON APPLIEDSYSTEMS
RESEARCH
A N D CYBERNETICS
640 (George Lasker ed., 1981) (emphasis in original).
I6*See IAJHMANN,
srdpm note 12, at 6 ("[Slystems define their own boundaries. They
differentiate themselves and thereby constitute the environment as whatever lies outside
the boundary.").
I6'Perhaps the best example of the contingency of harm and the subjectivity of
boundaries comes from the ongoing attempt to define and refine the limits of the human,
and, within that broader category, to designate specific types of humans. See generally
PETERIRONS,A PEOPLE'SHISTORY
OF THE SUPREME
COURT(1999); LEONARD
CASSUTO,
THE INHUMAN
RACE:THE RACIALGROTESQUE
I N AMERICAN
LITERATURE
A N D CULTURE
(1997); IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGALCONSTRUCTION
OF RACE
ENVIRONMENTS:
POSTMODERN
THEORY
A N D THE
(1996). See also CARYWOLFE,CRITICAL
PRAGMATICS
OF T H E "OUTSIDE"4 1 4 5 (1998); Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: SciCYence, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS,
BORGS,A N D WOMEN:THE REINVENTION
OF NATURE149 (1991); Etienne Balibar, Racism
IDENTITIES
57 (Chris Turner,
and Nationalism, in RACE, NATION,CLASS:AMBIGUOUS
trans., 1991).
164 EVERNDEN,
supra note 141, at 4.
165 See id. at 36.
'66SeeMARYDOUGLAS,PURITYA N D DANGER:AN ANALYSIS
OF T H E CONCEPTS
OF
POLLUTION
A N D TABOO35-36 (2000) (discussing dirt and pollution as windows through
which to view a system's ordering methods). Dirt, according to Douglas, is never an isolated event: "Where there is dirt there is system." Id. at 35.
'61
Specifically, the Act seeks to eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into . . . navigable waters" and to attain a "goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
OF THE
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contaminates a waterway is directly contingent on the optimal state of the
waterway as perceived by the system's constituents, which is a function
of where the waterway begins and ends. The relevant boundaries would
therefore appear to be those of the nation's waterways. Yet, far from simplifying the issue, designating boundaries raises a host of new questions.
Does a river begin at its headwaters? If so, is the snow pack on a mountaintop that will eventually melt into a river part of the river? Furthermore,
does the river end at its mouth? Would not the discharge of mercury into
a waterway also affect the place into which the river empties? Would not
polluting its headwaters also pollute the river? These are questions of
perception, not of fact.
In defining the optimal state of a waterway-a prerequisite for determining whether the waterway has been polluted-boundaries must be
set and agreed upon. Potential pollutants impede the attainment of that
perceived optimal state. Yet, there is no objective method for determining
when and if contamination takes place because that determination is contingent on systemic priorities. The optimal state of a given waterway is a
matter of fierce debate between the many constituencies that look to use
it. Such debates often transcend national boundaries.
In the international sphere, expectations of expectations between and
among societies are often not clearly established. Views on how people
"ought" to act vary widely from nation to nation. Consequently, the system of norms that potentially would be distilled into international law is
often ill-defined or non-existent. This is true even on the level of the most
basic human rights.'68The process of codifying international law requires
an ongoing negotiation between different societies' norms and expectations, a negotiation that takes place in language. Yet, in order for the law
to function in the international arena, language must also juggle the dual
roles of solidifying expectations and enabling adaptability. This task often requires surgical precision-a task further complicated by the existence of language barriers. These barriers exist even among nations that
ostensibly share a language. One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada.

propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water
. . . ." 33 U.S.C. 5 125 1 (a)(l)-(2) (2000).
Hannah Arendt, noting that all attempts to codify so-called "eternal Rights of Man"
into a set of international governing principles have failed, cites Edmund Burke's observation that human rights are an "abstraction" and that it makes more sense to claim that the
privileges one enjoys are the "rights of an Englishman" rather than inalienable human
rights. This is because rights spring from within the nation rather than from universal,
international norms. HANNAHARENDT,THEORIGINS
OF TOTALITARIANISM
298-99 (1979);
see also JOHN RAWLS,THELAWOF PEOPLES
3 4 (1999) (seeking to formulate a system of
norms that transcends national boundaries and is based on a liberal ideal of justice).
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B. The Trail Smelter Arbitration

The Trail Smelter Arbitration is one of the most influential pollution-related disputes in international law.169The arbitration arose from a
cooperative effort by the U.S. and Canada to mitigate the damage and compensate those injured by airborne pollutants that had crossed into the
U.S. from Canada. A principal problem facing both the parties and the
arbitrators involved the lack of consensus definitions within the international community for the key terms: pollutant and damage.I7O This same
problem-lack of common definitions-recurs in different form in Laidlaw.

I . History of the Smelter and the Arbitration
The Trail Smelter was built in 1896 in Trail, British Columbia. During
the ensuing years, emissions from the smelter drifted across the border
into Washington and fell in the form of acid rain and acid fog. Substantial property damage ensued.17' In 1928, individual claimants collectively
agreed not to pursue claims against the company that owned the smelter,
opting instead to wait while the matter was negotiated on a diplomatic
level. In 1931, the Canadian-United States International Joint Commission concluded that the smelter had caused $350,000 worth of damage in
the United States, with future damages to be determined and the amount
adjusted to reflect changing conditions.17*While the original award was
paid, the amount was never adjusted to reflect damages incurred after
1931 In 1935, the matter went into arbitration.
In 1941, the arbitration tribunal rejected the United States' claim for
more than $2 million in additional damages, awarding it a total of only
$78,000.174The tribunal based its decision in part on a finding that foreign emissions (i.e., pollutants) do not cause legal damage unless and
until that damage is actual, provable, and s u b ~ t a n t i a l . The
' ~ ~ tribunal's
'69 See Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L.
REV. 259, 259 (1971) ("Every discussion of the general international law relating to pollution starts, and must end, with a mention of the Trail Smelter Arbitration.").
I7O See, e.g., id. at 268:

The word "damage" was purportedly defined as "such as would be recoverable
under the decisions of the courts of the United States in suits between private individuals," but it seems clear that the tribunal was in fact not defining damage at
all with this language, but defining "damagesw-the extent to which there should
be monetary recovery for "damage." The importance of this confusion in language, and therefore in logic, cannot be emphasized too strongly.
See 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1917 (1941).
See id. at 1917-19.
I7'See id. at 1919.
' 7 4 See id. at 1940.
I7jSee id. at 1931-33; Rubin, supra note 169, at 273.
17'

'72
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finding effectively meant that foreign emissions caused no legal damage
until that damage was quantified. Thus, environmental degradation is not
actionable in and of itself. Rather, there must be an "environmental
plaintiff' by and through whom the damage may be assessed. Only then
can the action succeed. Under this regime, as in Laidlaw, the focus shifts
from the impact of foreign emissions on the environment to the impact of
foreign emissions on people's relationship to the environment. While the
tribunal did lay out the principle that nations must be responsible for
transboundary pollution, it found that only those claims that were quantifiable could succeed; those which could not be quantified necessarily
failed.176In effect, the decision introduced the Roman concept of sic utere
ut alienum non laedas (one should use one's own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another) to modern international environmental
law.'77However, requiring such explicitly defined proof of harm to justify
compensation effectively hamstrung the principle's future app1i~ation.l'~
According to the decision, if an injury could not be measured in
monetary terms, there was no damage and, hence, no remedy at law. Consequently, the United States received no compensation for having been subjected to the smelter's noxious fumes because no proven environmental
harm r e s ~ 1 t e d . Similarly,
I~~
the tribunal refused to hold Canada liable for
damage to urban property in the U.S. because "there [was] no proof of
facts sufficient to enable the Tribunal to estimate the reduction in the
value . . . of such p r ~ p e r t y . " ' ~ ~
According to the tribunal's findings, the fouling of a nation's air by
another nation is not compensable unless and until the damage can be
precisely appraised. Nor can a country seek damages when foreign emissions harm wildflowers, birds, or any other resource that has no assigned

176See

3 R.I.A.A. at 1965:

[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the temtory of another o r the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
'77 See Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between
Canada and the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV. 447, 451 (1995); Martin D.
Gelfand, Note, Practical Application of International Environmental Law: Does It Work
Atoll? 29 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 73,77 (1997).
178 While the passage of the decision enjoining states from allowing their temtory to
be used in such a way as to harm the territory of another is often hailed as a major step
forward in international environmental law, one commentator has noted that this portion of
the decision is pure dictum and predicated solely on American law. As such it created "no
unequivocal customary international law." Shashank Upadhye, The International Watercourse: An Exploitable Resource for the Developing Nation Under International Law?, 8
CARDOZO
J . INT'L & COMP.L. 6 1 , 8 6 (2000).
179See 3 R.I.A.A. at 1932.
180 Id. at 1931.
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monetary value.'s' The rationale for the decision stems from the tribunal's
attempt to assign fixed definitions to value-based and mutable terms like
pollutant, damage, and harm.

2. Parallels to Laidlaw
Consider again the situation in Laidlaw. Friends of the Earth decried
Laidlaw's discharges into the North Tyger River. Laidlaw argued (and the
district court agreed) that the discharges caused the river no harm.ls2 The
Supreme Court accepted this determination for purposes of the river's
ecology but decreed that the perception that the company's discharges
caused harm, in light of the company's admitted violations of the Clean
Water Act, constituted legal harm.Is3The dispute in Laidlaw, then, is not
over the level of discharges, or whether they occurred, but about whether
the damage they caused amounts to legal harm and, if so, how to quantify
that harm-the same issues which arose in the Trail Smelter Arbitration.
By requiring a showing of injury to the plaintiff for standing in Laidlaw,
the Court effectively finds that Clean Water Act violations (including
serious toxic events) that do not implicate humans in some manner are
not actionably harmful. This holding is similar to the Arbitration Tribunal's conclusion that damages that cannot be quantified in economic terms
do not constitute legal injury. In both cases, the impact of the defendant's
actions on the environment was subordinated to the impact of the defendant's actions on the plaintiff.
From a systems theoretical perspective, this result is completely rational. Systems theory posits that problems do not exist unless and until
they generate communication within the system. While "[flish or humans
may die because swimming in the seas and rivers has become unhealthy
. . . [a]s long as this is not the subject of communication it has no social
effect."ls4 In other words, until it is articulated, a disturbance (no matter
how ecologically significant) will not affect the system. It follows that if
communication about a disturbance can be suppressed, the system's functioning will continue unimpaired. This can cause (and has caused) serious problems as polluters attempt to cover up their misdeeds,ls5 thereby
Is1See Rubin, supra note 169, at 265:

If the tribunal's decision as to the indemnity owed by Canada to the United States
for "damage" resulting from the operation of the smelter is viewed as a definitive
statement of international law, the absence of any item of intangible damage . . .
implies that general international law permits a state to fail to regulate injurious
effusions that drift into the territory of a second state, as long as the damage done
is not directly translatable into a provable cash sum.
See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
See id.
LUHMANN,
supra note 12, at 28-29.
IS5See,e.g., JONATHAN
HARR,A CIVILACTION(1991) (chronicling the litigation arisIs*

Is3
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removing their actions from the realm of communication and rendering them
nonevents.lS6
In Laidlaw and the Trail Smelter Arbitration, communication about
the respective disturbances was not so much suppressed as stymied. The
parties lacked the necessary vocabulary to adequately describe the injury.
The Trail Smelter Tribunal could not find a consensus definition within
the international community (a loose confederation of linked social systems)
for the term "damage" and so chose to confine its scope to those injuries
that could be quantified in monetary terms. Similarly, the Laidlaw Court
faced the problem of defining environmental harm in terms that conformed to the tenets of traditional property interests (and thereby with
standing doctrine) even as the injury itself defied such easy categorization. Because of the nature of environmental citizen suits-the statute
requires no injury and the plaintiff herself seeks no monetary damagesthe Court could not meet its goal and was forced to reframe the issue as
one of measuring injury to the plaintiffs.
While the Laidlaw decision hinges on standing, it does so only because of the Court's continued unwillingness to recognize that the issues
before it were not truly procedural (i.e., whether the plaintiffs satisfied
the criteria for standing) but were rather questions of fact and substantive
law. Perhaps this is because nothing short of a fundamental restructuring
would cure the woes of standing doctrine, and the Court is understandably reluctant to take on such a task.
In addition, the issues in Laidlaw, as with many of the Court's seminal cases on standing and the environment, are much broader. More than
the validity of the plaintiffs' right to sue, the Court must address the question of how our culture defines harm outside the confines of traditional
ing from one such attempt).
ls6 This phenomenon is well illustrated by the controversy over whether entities regulated by environmental laws should be allowed to self-audit to determine their compliance
with federal and state laws and then to remediate any violations without suffering any
penalty. Seventeen states have adopted some form of self-audit law: Arkansas, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Rena Steinzor,
Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641, 663 11.60 (2003). The rationale for such a
policy is that regulated entities would theoretically police themselves more regularly and
thoroughly if the results of their investigations could not then be used against them in government enforcement actions. Opponents of the self-audit framework (including the EPA)
argue that such a regime actually gives entities an incentive to violate (by allowing them to
reap the economic gain from their misdeeds), and then to "discover" the problem and fix it
without penalty. See id. at 663; see generally Lisa Koven, The Environmental Self-Audit
Evidentiary Privilege, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1167 (1998), Brooks M. Beard, The New Environmental Federalism: Can the EPA's Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA. ENVTL.L.J.
1 (1997). The controversy can be analyzed in systems theoretical terms. The regulated
entities look to suppress communication in order to eliminate systemic disturbance
whereas the self-audit regime's opponents maintain that the system's ability to function
depends on effective communication and response to disturbance rather than elimination of
potential disturbance through suppression of information.
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property interests and specifically within the context of environmental protection. This same issue is addressed in a different context in the novel
Animal Dreams, to which we now turn.
C . Animal Dreams and the Rhetoric of Environment

I.

The Novel

A~limalDreams is set in the fictional town of Grace, Arizona, where
the indigenous Hispanic community faces the acidification of its river by
the Black Mountain Mining Company. When the mine became unprofitable
to run, the company laid off the local workers and began leaching acid
through its enormous tailings piles in order to extract the minerals still
contained therein.Is7 The acids used in this process seeped into the water
table and the river, leading to the death of the river's aquatic life as well
as the crops and trees that depended on the water for survival.'88
This devastation of the local ecosystem did not concern the mining
company. It had determined that damming the river and desiccating the
town could circumvent the environmental laws protecting the town's water supply. Damming the river would remove the river from the jurisdiction of the EPA, thereby enabling the company to continue its leaching
activities. lS9
In the face of this looming catastrophe, the women of the town band
together and successfully challenge the monolithic power of the Company and the silently complicit EPA. They succeed in having the town
designated a national historic place, thus protecting both the town and the
river from further encroachment from the mining company.'g0Once listed
as an historic site, the town need no longer fear "the onslaught of industry" nor "demolition or other negative irnpa~t."'~'
Invoking government
regulations to protect the town offers a stark contrast to the regulatory
inertia of the EPA that permitted the problem to escalate.
Though the town of Grace is saved and the novel ends on a happy
note, the town's historic status offers no long-term implications for sysI8'See BARBARA
KINGSOLVER,
ANIMAL
DREAMS
43-44,63-64 (1990).
188 See id.
See id. at 1 1 1. When Codi Noline, the protagonist, naively assumes that a report to

the local authorities will halt the leaching operation, Viola, the town matriarch, quickly
disabuses her:
"Dam up the river," Viola said. "That's all they have to do to meet with the EPA
laws. Dam it up and send it out Tortoise Canyon instead of down through here
. . . . [I]f Black Mountain dams up the river, it's out of the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency."

Id.
See id. at 274-77.
l9!

Id. at 277.
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temic reform. It merely spares one town a dismal fate. Similar situations
will inevitably occur in other locales. This prospect blunts any sense of
elation the reader might otherwise feel at Grace's salvation. The most
that victories like Grace's can offer is pleasure tempered by a grim awareness of things to come.192
2.

The Subject of Harm

Although the preceding thumbnail sketch omits the novel's subtlety
and richness and thereby does the work a terrible disservice, it conveys
enough of the plot to illustrate my point. For present purposes, the novel's
importance inheres in the differing visions of harm evinced by the townsfolk of Grace and the managers of the mine, respectively. It is not just
that the parties differ about whether harm occurred. More fundamentally,
they differ on the essential nature of the term.
Grace's inhabitants view the mine's leaching operation as pernicious
to the community and to the region.'93 The river and the water it carries
are integral to their culture and to the well being of the town, as well as to
the crops upon which the local people depend for sustenance. The river's
demise will doom the community as well. For the people of Grace, this is
clearly an unacceptable scenario.
From the company's perspective, however, poisoning the river amounts
to an insignificant side effect of a beneficial process. The Company's
publicist might describe the acid leaching operation as a "recycling" of
the tailings to extract surplus value from already processed material and
thereby provide the greatest possible return to shareholders. The river is
not vital to the firm's continued profitability, and its contamination poses
no danger to the mine's ~iabi1ity.l~~
On the other hand, damming the river
will serve two simultaneous, beneficial purposes: it will free the company
from the regulatory oversight of the EPA, and it will destroy the town of
Grace. Destroying the town will eliminate the power base of the grassroots resistance to the mine's operation.
The opposing views represented by the mine and the townsfolk--each
of which represent a different systemic perspective-reiterate the flexibility

See CASSUTO,supra note 143, at 117-19.
See KINGSOLVER,
supra note 187, at 179 (Codi Noline, invited to speak to a gathering of the women of Grace (which she calls the "Stitch and Bitch C l u b ) , observes that
"the Stitch and Bitch Club would officially sanction mass demonstrations against Black
Mountain's leaching operation, to be held daily on the dam construction site . . . .
Unofficially, the Stitch and Bitch Club would have no objection if a bulldozer met with
premature demise.").
194 See id. at 6 3 4 4 (discussing the effect of the river's acidification on the local orchards-the spread of "poison ground." As one Grace resident observed: "They're getting
gold and moly out of them tailing pipes. If they wasn't, they wouldn't keep running the
acid through them. They're not going to stop no leaching operation on account of our pecan trees.")
193

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 114 2004

20041

Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms

115

of the term "pollutant." The mining company considers the sulfuric acid
an asset (and the river extraneous). Grace's residents, by contrast, view
the acid as a pollutant (and the river as essential). If pollution means
matter out of place, or a foreign object interfering with the efficiency of a
given system, both sides are correct.195Clearly, terms like "unnatural,"
"harm," and "pollutant" must be regarded as creations of the systems that
give them meaning. In addition, when one considers the infinite number
of systems, all of which are observer-defined (which is to say their boundaries are a function of perspective) and self-interested, consensus definitions
for terms like harm and pollutant seem unattainable grails. This is not a
"problem" with language; it is rather language giving expression to the
inherently contingent nature of the concepts themse1ves.l"
The concept of harm should link to the health and well-being of the
social system and the system's ability to perpetuate itself, rather than tying
itself to an uneasy compromise between and among our limited scientific
knowledge, tenuous commitment to conservation, and the unyielding demands of a market economy. Such an approach would not identify the
natural environment; it would instead acknowledge the complex interrelationship between and among all members of the social system (human
and n ~ n - h u m a n )as
, ~ well
~ ~ as the shared imperative of the system's selfreproduction. Furthermore, since the system depends on the environment
to spur evolution (without which it would stagnate and die),198it stands to
reason that the well being of the system's environment is integral to the
system's overall integrity and longevity.lg9
V. LAIDLAw AS WATERSHED-SUGGESTIONS FOR
STANDINGLESS
JURISPRUDENCE

A

Returning to Luidlaw, we must ask what the mutability and subjectivity of terms like harm, pollution, and even environment mean for the
law of standing and the workability of the Clean Water Act and other environmental laws. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, using harm to
the environment as the determinative criterion for standing-as the dissent suggests-is untenable. Multivalent and constantly shifting perspec19= Cf: Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960)
(pointing out that the allocation of legal entitlements implies an environmental harm if a
polluter owns the right to pollute, or an economic harm to the polluter if other parties own
the right to be free from polluting).
'%SeeLUHMANN,
supra note 13, at 182.
Ig7 See CASSUTO,
supra note 143, at 129-3 1.
198 Systems require disturbance to evolve. If there were no environmental disturbance,
the system would not need to adapt. It would become inert, essentially lifeless. See id. at
125.
'"See, e.g., BRUNOLATOUR,W E HAVENEVERBEENMODERN15 (Catherine Porter
trans., 1993) (noting the need to describe our "discursive constitution" through which we
"[define] humans and nonhumans, their properties and their relations, their abilities and
their groupings").
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tives, as well as the expanding boundaries of scientific knowledge, make
any such determination impossible. Yet removing the environment from
the standing equation in an environmental statute, and focusing exclusively on injury to the plaintiff-as
the majority advocates-is
equally
unfeasible. The issue of harm (or injury) is a substantive, fact-based query
and must be treated as such.
A. Letting the Statute Dejine the Injury
Judge Fletcher has suggested reworking the notion of standing to
make the operative query be: whether or not the injury alleged falls
within the category of injuries that the statute was enacted to prevent.'""
This formulation would satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article I11 without falling prey to the caprice of modern standing doctrine.
Because the statute's enactment would create a substantive legal right, it
follows that the statute's violation would create a legal injury.201In Laidlaw, for example, the inquiry would not address who was injured or how.
No such investigation would be necessary because the Clean Water Act
plainly states that simply violating the Act creates a legally cognizable
injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs' standing would hinge on the court's determination that the manner of violation alleged was a type the statute aimed
to prevent.
In the case of Laidlaw, the court would ask whether the discharge of
pollutants into the North Tyger River in excess of permitted amounts was
something that the Clean Water Act was designed to prevent. The answer: of course. The Act mandates water quality standards designed to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters" by eliminating the discharge of pollutant^.^^' Entities
wishing to discharge effluents must obtain permits and adhere to the
limitations contained therein.203The statute further states that entities that
violate the terms of the Act are subject to citizen
In Laidlaw, we
have a company discharging more mercury (a heavy metal and a CWA
pollutant) into a waterway than its permit allows. It is hard to imagine a
category of injury that fits more neatly within the statutory parameters
than this one.
The Fletcher approach has the dual advantages. of comprehensibility
and workability. It eliminates unproductive inquiries into the nature of
2W See Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, supra note 11, at 223-24; see also Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 I, at 166-67.
20' As Fletcher argues, this is the very essence of statutory (rather than Constitutional)
injury. For the Court to go further and evaluate whether the injury defined by Congress is
judicially cognizable "limits the power of the legislature to articulate public values and
choose the manner in which they may be enforced." Fletcher, supra note 11, at 233.
202 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(a) (2000).
203 See 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000).
204See33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000).
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the injuries suffered by the named plaintiffs as a result of the Act's violation. All that would be required for a citizen suit to lie is for the plaintiff to allege an injury of the type enjoined by the statute.205

B. Subjectivity Remains-The Galileo Problem
Under this new regime, the problem might appear resolved. Unfortunately, it is not. As noted earlier,206the Clean Water Act defines "pollutant" to include biological material, rock, sand, and heat,207all of which
occur naturally both in and out of waterways. While each of these phenomena can potentially disrupt an aquatic ecosystem, each is also a naturally occurring component of those ecosystems. Though standing jurisprudence (including Laidlaw) has long acknowledged that threatened
harm is sufficient for citizen
it does not acknowledge that such an
admission throws the meaning of the term pollutant, as well as the stated
aim of the Clean Water Act, into flux. Furthermore, if the determinative
criterion for designating pollutants were the potential to cause harm, the
definition would encompass virtually everything-both human-made and
naturally occurring.209
A phenomenon becomes a pollutant only if it disrupts the functioning of a given system. Even then, it becomes a pollutant only from the
point of view of that particular system. As we saw in Animal Dreams,
one system might view sulfuric acid as harmless or even beneficial, while
another would classify it as a dangerous pollutant. Consequently, attempts to legislate for pollutant-free waterways are destined to fail.
These attempts will also create imbroglios like the one in Laidlaw, where
the Court found the defendant liable for an admittedly harmless discharge of pollutants even though a harmless pollutant amounts to a contradiction in terms. This situation arose because a supposedly objective
definition of a contingent term (pollutant) was inserted into a statute designed to protect an equally mutable concept (the environment). This is

See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 264-65.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
207 33 U.S.C. 0 1362(6) (2000).
208See,e.g., Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 1 8 6 8 1 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 155-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (following h i d l a w to find that
affiant sufficiently alleged injury when defendant's alleged NPDES violations threatened
the environmental quality of water adjoining affiant's property, even though plaintiff may
not have produced sufficient evidence to prove actual harm).
209 While a pollutant may cause harm only in certain concentrations and, thus, there
might not be harm from a discharge that failed to reach that concentration, this simply
underscores the nebulousness of the term. If pollutants are classified based on their porenrial to cause harm, then all things are pollutants to varying degrees. This would be an impossible standard around which to craft laws. For example, the goal of the Clean Water
Act-the elimination of pollutants in the nation's waterways, see 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)
(2000)-becomes completely meaningless.
2M
206
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an example of the law using the rhetoric of science to lend an air of objectivity to its provisions. In short, it is what I call a Galileo Problem.
Galileo Problems come from grafting a veneer of objectivity onto products of human thought and language. Galileo's views implicitly demonstrated that the laws of astronomy were not divine, immutable, and objective, but actually contingent, knowledge-based, and normative. This
precipitated a crisis of faith in the legitimacy of the law.210Systems and
environments can affect no pretense of o b j e ~ t i v i t y . Consequently,
~'~
harm
to any given system is subjective and context-dependent and can only be
defined within that narrow context. Any attempt to broaden the meaning
of harm to encompass multiple systems inevitably dilutes the term beyond the point of utility.
Laidlaw illustrates this nicely. Harm, for purposes of the Clean Water Act, arises from the discharge of pollutants into waterways. "Pollutant" is context-dependent and is no longer referential absent a showing of
harm. But under Laidlaw, discharging pollutants into waterways is not
necessarily harmful, nor must a discharge be harmful to be actionable. It
follows then that a substance need not be harmful to be a pollutant under
the statute. Yet, pollutants are harmful by definition. If a pollutant need
not cause harm, then it seems that anything at all could be a pollutant
(and indeed, under the statute's definition,this is very nearly the case).
Thus, any discharge of anything by anybody into the vicinity of a waterway theoretically falls under the regulatory aegis of the Clean Water Act
and potentially requires a permit. Furthermore, a citizen may prosecute
any failure to adhere to discharge limits so long as that citizen believes
that the discharge could cause or has caused harm. This is, of course, an
impossible scenario and not the intended consequence of the Laidlaw
decisi~n.~'~
In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the Fletcher method
of determining standing by assessing whether the injury alleged is a type
the statute was designed to prevent will not wholly resolve the standing
issue in the environmental arena. Without further clarification of the
meaning of "pollutant," it does no good to decree that discharges of pollutants into waterways are the type of injury that the Clean Water Act
was designed to prevent; the statement is meaningless. States will have
no guidelines upon which to base their permitting processes, and citizens
210Asone commentator rhetorically asks, "Is the court [that judged Galileo] right or
wrong? . . . Since justice speaks performatively and since what it says begins suddenly to
exist by the sole fact that it says it, since justice gives rise to jurisprudence in any case,
what indeed does it matter. . . to be wrong or right?" SERRES,
supra note 8, at 82.
211Seesupra note 162 and accompanying text; GREGORY
BATESON,STEPSTO AN
ECOLOGY
OF MIND454-55 (1972) (discussing the notion that "territory" is a series of
maps and representations created by observers; territory, the thing itself, can never be seen.
"All 'phenomena' are literally 'appearances."').
2'2Seeh i d l a w IV, 528 U.S. at 183-84 (comparing plaintiff's allegations of harm to
those found inadequate in previous cases).
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will have virtually unfettered ability to contest actions by entities that
impact waterways. This is precisely the type of administrative bedlam
envisioned by the
C. Solving the Galileo Problem-A New Rhetoric of
Environmental Protection

I.

The Well-being of the Social System as the Criterion for Injury

How can this Galileo-based problem of legal terminology and application be resolved? I suggest that, using Judge Fletcher's elegant framework as a starting point, it becomes possible to craft a flexible and therefore functional definition of harm that facilitates the operation of the
Clean Water Act and its sister statutes.
The legal system is a sub-system designed to maintain the health and
continued survival of the larger social system. Laws, as products of the
legal system, are enacted in furtherance of that goaL2I4All systems, including the social system, share the twin imperatives of self-reproduction
and self-preservation.215Perhaps the best way to measure legal harm is to
determine whether the disturbance complained of negatively affects the
social system's health and longevity.
The goal of the Clean Water Act is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."216
The statute identifies the interposition of pollutants into those waters as
negative and mandates their elimination in order to ensure, among other
things, that fish, shellfish and wildlife can thrive, as well as to enhance
recreational opp~rtunities.~"
To achieve that goal, the Act allows for citizen suits in the event of any type of violation, regardless of whether the
illicit behavior causes actual harm to the e n v i r ~ n r n e n t . ~ ' ~
id. at 201-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Some critics maintain that the legal apparatus serves to perpetuate its own legitimacy and ossifies rather than enables the social system. According to Robin West, the legal
system2 1 3 See
214

through its symbols, language, arguments, and general control over the means of
normative legal discourse--creates in the citizenry what the critics sometimes call
"clusters of beliefs" in the overriding legitimacy of the social structures of
empowerment and disempowerment that constitute the larger society of which the
legal system is only a part . . . . The result is that the vast bulk of the particular
rules and the process of the extant system that govern our behavior are seen as
morally legitimate-as in accord with our moral beliefs. Meaningful criticism of
law against truly independent moral standards is thereby frustrated.
& LAW5-6 (1993).
ROBINWEST, NARRATIVE,
AUTHORITY
215 See PAULSON,
supra note 146, at 121-27.
216 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) (2000).
217 Id. 5 125 1 (a)( 1-2).
218 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 119 2004

120

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 28

The breadth of citizen suit authority suggests that the statute's drafters were as concerned with the integrity of the statutory regime as with
the abatement of imminent threats to the nation's waterways. From a
systems theoretical perspective, this is quite reasonable. The system functions by eliminating threats to itself. Those threats need not be ecosystemic; they can also arise when system components break the rules (as
codified by the legal system) through which the system functions. Laws
that are neither obeyed nor enforced undermine societal expectations of
expectations and imperil the system's functioning. For example, if one
cannot expect motorists to stop for red lights, there is little reason to have
red lights. Without them, chaos would soon engulf the streets. Motorists
would drive blindly into intersections until a new traffic regime was codified
and everyone once again adhered to a common set of norms.
The traffic analogy carries over into environmental law. Neither the
federal government nor individual states have the resources to enforce every
environmental law in every instance. As a result, they enforce selectively,
focusing on only the most egregious violation^.^'^ This selective enforcement means that regulated entities would have little to fear if their
violations did not reach a level where they became an agency priority.
Given the breadth and scope of environmental laws, this would mean that
the laws would be breached more often.220Citizen suits have traditionally
filled this enforcement gap.22'
The rationale for citizen suits is the same as that for state enforcement actions. There need not be an actual and quantifiable injury for a
law to be enforced. Rather, when the law is not enforced, the law itself is
threatened and that threat in turn imperils the system and all its components. The drafters of the Clean Water Act (and other environmental statSee Adler, supra note 28, at 49.
2 2 0 T h iis~ arguably the case now. According to one survey, only thirty percent of corporate counsels felt it was possible for their companies to comply fully with state and federal environmental laws. See id. Some would argue, as Adler does, that the inability of
regulated entities to comply with the various environmental laws, coupled with the ease
with which citizens can file suit, makes for a haphazard enforcement regime that does little
to protect the environment. See id. at 5 9 4 2 . However, Adler's contention that citizen suits
lie at the root of the problem (and that the Laidlaw framework further undermines the goal
of environmental protection by easing standing requirements) does not address what I
believe to be the real issue-the irrelevance of injury to the plaintiff and the amorphousness of harm to the environment. Neither forms an effective criterion for standing. Adler
argues that citizen suits are often driven by special interests rather than a desire to benefit
the environment and that Laidlaw's holding will only exacerbate this phenomenon. See id.
at 59. However, as discussed above, benefit (and harm) to the environment is subjectively
determined and inherently variable. Restricting citizen access to the courts will not change
that. All it will do is enhance the ability of violators to flout the law. If there is a problem
with the current regulatory regime, (and few would deny that it is a ponderous and byzantine set of laws), it would seem more efficient to focus on making the laws more coherent
and effective rather than hamstringing citizen enforcement capabilities.
221 See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 11, at 165 (noting that
Congress has used the citizen suit as "a mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate
enforcement of the law").
219
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utes) were clearly aware of this possibility and created a private right of
action to help contain it.
Applying this perspective to Laidlaw, Friends of the Earth could
have argued that Laidlaw's actions threatened the social system by poisoning the river in a manner proscribed by the Clean Water Act. Laidlaw
could have responded that its discharges were negligible, the river's biotic health unimpaired, and the system's smooth functioning never endangered. In addition, Laidlaw's violations were redressed by a state enforcement action and the payment of a fine. Consequently, according to
Laidlaw, there would be neither need nor basis for further litigation.
Faced with these facts, the Court should have little trouble finding
that the suit is viable and that plaintiffs should prevail. Polluted waterways threaten the longevity and self-reproductive capacity of the sysThe Clean Water Act was enacted to protect the system from just
these types of dangers and creates rules governing acceptable levels of
Under the Act's standards, a substance that causes no harm
under certain conditions may nonetheless be regulated if its discharge
poses a threat to the system's welfare.224This method conforms with an
approach that classifies pollutants according to their potential to cause
harm to a given system. Though mercury may not cause discernible damage at low concentrations, it remains appropriate to regulate its discharge
because it is toxic to marine life (and humans) and can bio-accumulate.
Consequently, its presence threatens the system's ability to survive and selfreproduce. If multiple regulated entities exceeded their discharge limits,
the resulting mercury concentrations in the river could threaten the integrity of the ecosystem as well as the health of the people who use the
river. Thus, the system itself faces peril.
When Laidlaw's mercury discharges exceeded permitted levels, it
created a threat to the system as well as an impediment to the system's
goal of attaining and maintaining clean water and a smooth functioning
regulatory apparatus. Laidlaw's actions therefore negatively impacted the
system's health and reproductive capability. Therein lies the harm. The
222 When the Senate Conference Committee was considering the bill creating the Clean
Water Act, Senator Muskie referred to water pollution as "a cancer" that "[wle have ignored for so long that the romance of environmental concern is already fading into the
shadow of the grim realities of lakes, rivers and bays where all forms of life have been
smothered by untreated wastes, and oceans which no longer provide us with food." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 107, at 161-62.
223 See id. at 164 (noting that the statute's statement of goals, including the elimination
of discharges of pollutants, is "not merely the pious declarations that Congress so often
makes in passing its laws" but is rather "literally a life or death proposition for the Nation").
224 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened
rather than actual injury can satisfy Article 111 standing requirements . . . . Threatened
environmental injury is by nature probabilistic. And yet other circuits have had no trouble
understanding the injurious nature of risk itself.").
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Clean Water Act allows for a private right of action to redress that harm.
Consequently, Friends of the Earth's citizen suit seems perfectly appropriate. It should not be necessary to show that Laidlaw's actions caused a
measurable degradation of the ecosystem nor injury to a particular person
in order for the suit to lie.
An analysis based on a determination of whether the system is
threatened will likely allow standing for virtually any allegation of
statutory violations, assuming the statute at issue has a citizen suit provision. Such a result seems both reasonable and beneficial.225The citizen
suit is designed to enable citizens to function as private attorneys general.
Public attorneys general are charged with protecting the system from
threats born of violations of the law. To prosecute a case, they need show
no more than that an actionable transgression occurred. The basis for
legal action lies in the law violated and the nature of the transgression.
The same reasoning should carry over to citizen suits. The current doctrine requires plaintiffs to allege injury to themselves despite the statute's
focus on the environment, and the Fletcher framework would require potential litigants to allege injury of a type that the statute was designed to
prevent (thereby necessitating an unwieldy inquiry into the type of injury
alleged). In contrast, the system-based approach eliminates the need for
an injury analysis by making it implicit. A threat or injury to the legal
system constitutes a threat or injury to all components of the social system. If the threat is actionable under a statute containing a citizen suit
clause, then a citizen may bring suit to redress it.
This approach does not run afoul of Article I11 since it too involves a
case or controversy, injury, and a method of redress. Under this approach,
however, courts would no longer be able to bar suits on the grounds that
plaintiffs have not alleged adequate injury to themselves. Instead, the harm
to the system would suffice and the suit could be adjudged on its merits.
2. Diligent Enforcement
The only remaining obstacle to justiciability lies with the fact that
Laidlaw's actions already were the subject of an enforcement action by
the state. In light of the suit and subsequent settlement between Laidlaw
and the DHEC, the question becomes whether the system's health and
longevity is threatened by a violation that has already been the subject of
an enforcement action. The statute's language suggests otherwise; it bars
citizen suits that follow state a ~ t i o n s . " We
~ must consider whether the
facts of the case are such that the injury alleged continues to threaten the

225 The workability of this scenario is predicated on well-drafted, workable statutory
definitions. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
226 See 33 U.S.C.
5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000).
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system's health and longevity and therefore whether the injury remains of
the type that the statute was enacted to prevent.
The Court squarely and correctly addresses this issue. Laidlaw's
permit violations occurred both before and after FOE filed suit. The suit
was filed after the state reached its settlement with laid la^.'^' It is therefore possible to conclude: (1) that the state enforcement action was not
diligently prosecuted, as the Act requires;228and (2) that the ongoing violations posed a continuing threat to the health and integrity of the system.
Furthermore, vigorous enforcement (as opposed to imposing a token fine
and exacting a pledge to do better) will likely deter similar activities by
other entities, thereby protecting the system from future threat.229Consequently, the injury alleged by FOE was of the type the statute was designed to prevent and the Court correctly sustained the plaintiff's verdict.

3. Summary: A Long-term Solution to a Long-term Problem
The crucial differences between the Court's method for adjudicating
environmental disputes and the one presented here are that under the proposed framework, (1) statutes' stated goals of environmental protection take
precedence over what are often contrived or ancillary injuries to plaintiffs;
(2) unwieldy and extraneous standing inquiries become unnecessary; and
(3) the relevant terminology gains coherence, which in turn brings the
concept of "environmental protection" into focus. Environmental protection is less about preserving nature than about acknowledging the interrelatedness of systems and environments. Because the boundaries between system and environment shift constantly, the notion of environment must remain forever in flux. The key to environmental protection
therefore lies in eschewing rigidly defined boundaries and rules and instead adopting norms capable of responding to changing conditions. In
this sense, the social system's imperative of self-preservation impels it to
act as its own environmental protection agency.230
A scheme like the one just described would constitute a significant
departure from the status quo. At present, both the legal system and the
larger notion of environmental protection lack structural integrity. The
majority opinion in Laidlaw is but one example of a widespread tendencyas evidenced by the Trail Smelter Arbitration and Animal Dreams examples-to create laws and regulatory frameworks based on supposedly objec227 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 178 (2000) (noting that after FOE commenced its action,
Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limits thirteen times, as well as committed twentythree other violations).
228 See Laidlaw 1, 890 F. Supp. 470, 498 n.l (D.S.C. 1995); Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at
167.
229 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 185-86.
230 See generally Timothy Luke, On Environmentaliry: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge
CRITIQUE
30, 57-82
in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism, CULTURAL
(I 995).
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tive definitions of subjective concepts like harm, pollution, and environment.
Within the social system, language presents choices and possibility
while law provides the delimiting force that narrows possibility and solidifies expectations.231But if language is used to present false choices, as
with the majority's opposition of injury to the plaintiff versus harm to the
environment, the law's authority is undermined, the shared expectations
of expectations that enable the system's functioning are crippled, and a
legitimation crisis becomes inevitable. In Laidlaw, the Court avers that
all that need occur for standing is for the plaintiff to believe she has been
injured. That formulation, though well intentioned, cannot long survive.
Because of its ruling, the Court faces the daunting prospect of having to
select which types of perceived injuries enable standing under the various
environmental statutes-an overwhelming and constantly evolving task.
The net result of this untenable state of affairs is that societal expectations vis-b-vis environmental protection are eroding. This erosion does not
stem solely from the Laidlaw opinion but rather from an overall lack of
discipline and clarity in the rhetoric of environment and environmental
protection. This imprecision generates false oppositions that present false
choices. Consider, for example, a President and Congress arguing about
whether to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration or
to continue our national dependence on foreign oil. In the Northwest, the
false oppositions are between salmon and prosperity, or owls and timber.
In the Midwest, debates over corporate average fuel economy pit the viability of the auto industry against increased fuel efficiency for motor
vehicles. These types of choices, though specious, are omnipresent.
False choices arise as much from linguistic subjectivity as from
ideological differences. The inability to see past the rhetoric to imbedded
inconsistencies within the debate comprises a root cause of our environmental dilemma. A workable template for "environmental protection"
must allow for the fact that many of the key terms in the debate-including environment and protection, as well as harm and pollution-lack
consensus definitions. The goal, however, should not be defining these
terms; their meaning is intertwined with their subjectivity. Instead, we
must acknowledge that subjectivity is inherent within both the language
and the human condition. This requires crafting laws that allow for linguistic uncertainty and for the shifting nature of norms and expectations.
The alternative involves drafting and interpreting laws in a manner that
defies an essential component of the human experience. The latter method
has been the policy up to now. It is time for a new approach.

231

See LUHMANN,
supra note 13, at 82.

Heinonline - - 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 124 2004

20041

Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms

125

D. Postscript: NEPA and the Rhetoric of Environmental Protection
As the preceding discussion has shown, pollutants cannot be eliminated; the goal itself is meaningless. One system's pollutant is another's
necessity. It is therefore understandable that courts get tangled in discussions of harm and the intent and coverage of the various environmental
protection laws while the statutes' varied language creates serious difficulties 'for enforcement and judicial review. Statutes do exist, though,
wherein the language of subjectivity is woven into the text. One of the better
examples of this is NEPA.232Though strictly procedural in nature and
thus often emasculated in its application, NEPA contains language that is
admirably precise in its acknowledgment of the subjectivity of harm and
in its attempts to articulate contexts and benchmarks through which to
measure that harm.
Though it lacks the statutory means to enforce its stated goals,233
NEPA nevertheless makes it a matter of policy for federal agencies to use
all practicable means to administer federal programs in the most environmentally sound manner possible.234This proviso resembles language
in most other environmental statutes and is too general to be meaningful.
However, subsequent language clarifies its intent. For example, NEPA
speaks of the need to "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surrounding^,"^^^ to "preserve important historical and cultural aspects of our national heritage,"236
to "enhance the quality of renewable resources,"237and to "achieve a balance between population and resource use."238This language lays out the
systemic priorities the statute seeks to protect and provides the rhetorical
tools with which to do so.
Returning to the Animal Dreams example, one can readily see how
the Black Mountain Mining Company could argue that damming the river

23242U.S.C. $5 4321-4370 (2000).
233 NEPA requires any proposed federal action to be evaluated for its environmental
impact. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. Once the study has been prepared,
however, there is no mechanism under NEPA through which to evaluate the merits of the
proposed action in light of its anticipated environmental impact.
234 See 42 U.S.C. 5 4321:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent o r eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
Id.
Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
235
236

5 433 1 (b)(2).
5 433 1 (b)(4).
5 433 1 (b)(6).
5 433 1 (b)(5).
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and destroying Grace would be "safe" and "productive."239However, it is
hard to imagine the company straight-facedly maintaining that the dam
would preserve important historical and cultural aspects of our national
heritage. It also seems unlikely that the company could persuade a court
that the dam would enhance the quality of renewable resources, or
achieve a balance between population and resource use. Consequently, if
held to the standards enumerated in NEPA, the Company's dam proposal
would die on the vine.
NEPA requires that agencies proposing actions evaluate potential
environmental consequences.240The Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ"), whose primary function is to advise the President on environmental matters,241has stated that these evaluations must consider public
health, unique features of the region, precedential effect of the action,
and any anticipated controversy.242 If the Trail Smelter tribunal had
evaluated these factors, it almost certainly would have concluded that the
damages incurred by the local population in Washington were cognizable. The acid rain and acid fog generated by the smelter fumes posed a
health risk that should have been evident even in 1938, and the pollution
also severely affected the region's unique features (e.g., the farmland of
the Columbia River basin). Moreover, the precedential effects of a ruling
that denied the existence of damages except as might be measured in
monetary terms were foreseeable and considerable. Finally, the controversy arising from the smelter's emissions was already present and clear.
The language in NEPA is useful because it is flexible and provides a
basis to demarcate systemic goals. These goals are norms--expectations
of expectations, and shared visions of how things ought to go. The norms
of preserving esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings, protectSee supra note 196 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2) (2000). That evaluation can and often does take the form
of an Environmental Impact Statement. Id. 5 4332(2)(C):
239

240

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all
agencies of the federal government shall . . . include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and]
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action . . . .
24'Seeid. $ 5 4 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 . The CEQ is a creation of NEPA. Its interpretations of the
statute are entitled to substantial judicial deference. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347,
358 (1978).
242 See 40 C.F.R. 5 1508.27(b)(1)-(10) (2003); see also Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A
Primer on an 'Old' Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10060, 10064
(1989) (discussing factors an agency should consider to determine whether a proposed
action has 'significant effects' for NEPA purposes).
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ing the public health and geographically unique features, and avoiding
controversy govern the statute's interpretation while remaining adaptable
to changes in circumstance. This language outlines a normative framework through which the statute can function and allows its interpreters to
gauge the severity of any alleged injury by measuring it against systemic
priorities. This goal-driven flexibility enables the legal system to articulate expectations while allowing them to shift within established parameters.
The flexibility of the language employed in NEPA is broadly applicable within environmental law even as its terms remain subject to debate. Disputants may contest, for example, whether a given action deleteriously impacts public health, an issue that readily lends itself to litigation and judicial resolution. Contrast this with Laidlaw, where the parties
could not agree on whether harm occurred, and if so, to whom or to what.
Faced with all this uncertainty, the Laidlaw Court decreed-in
contravention of the statute-that the issue of whether the waterway had been
harmed was all but irrelevant to whether plaintiffs could sue. In addition,
despite the lack of reference in the statute to the well-being of citizens
bringing suit, the Court nevertheless determined that the viability of the
lawsuit hinged on the plaintiffs having suffered injury. This type of scenario, wherein the Court loses sight of a statute's goals because of an
uneasy relationship with Article 111, would be less likely to occur under a
regime where the statutory language did not pretend to objectivity, but
instead acknowledged the influence of the social system on both its creation and interpretation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Environmental law differs in fundamental respects from laws based
on traditional property interests. S o too must the rhetoric in which such
laws are framed. Current standing doctrine has no place in environmental
jurisprudence, where injury to the plaintiff has little relevance. A case
like Laidlaw, where the Court finds itself adjudicating an issue that has
no connection to the governing statute (in addition to making no sense),
underscores an incoherence that endangers the larger goal of environmental protection. The problem of standing for citizen suits raised by
Laidlaw is but a symptom of a larger problem arising from the use of
contingent language to set supposedly concrete goals. As the Trail Smelter
Arbitration and Animal Dreams examples demonstrate, such attempts
cannot succeed and can severely undermine the integrity of the legal
system. They merely exacerbate a Galileo Problem based in entrenched
notions of valuation drawn from traditional property-based norms.
Since both harm and environment are subjectively determined, the goal
of environmental protection must be flexible and similarly subjective.
The common denominator among the multiple perspectives is member-
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ship in the social system. Each entity and component system shares the
imperative of maintaining the smooth functioning of the social system.
Norms are constructed and statutes enacted to further that goal. Rather
than relying on an unworkable notion of standing to determine the viability of a cause of action, courts should consider whether the injury
complained of is of the type the statute seeks to prevent and whether it
threatens the health and longevity of the social system. This framework
satisfies the dictates of Article I11 while enabling the legal system to respond to both the contingency of language and the flexibility of norms.
Therefore, contrary to the infamous sentence from Laidlaw with which
this Article began, the relevant showing for purposes of Article I11 need
be neither injury to the plaintiff nor harm to the environment. Instead,
the viability of citizen suits should derive from the ambit of the statute
and its role in maintaining the well being of the social system.
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